Qibya massacre
The Qibya massacre was carried out by two Israeli units, a paratroop company and Unit 101 under the command of Ariel Sharon (current president of Israel). It led to the death of 68 Palestinians and the demolition of most houses in Qibya, a village in the northwestern West Bank (Samaria), which was then under Jordanian control.
The background
The attack was not unprecedented, but rather the climax of border clashes, beginning almost immediately after the signing of the armistice in 1949. Contrary to provisions of the armstice, Israel was confronted by a wave of Palestinian infiltrators from Jordan, who the Jordanian Arab Legion turned a blind eye upon and sometimes even unofficially assisted. These conditions set up a fertile ground for a period of bitter border warfare, in which neither side spared the other's civilians.
On October 12, 1953, a mother and her two children were killed by a Jordanian grenade in the Israeli town of Yahud. The Israeli government decided to carry out a retaliatory strike against the village of Qibya in the West Bank. The order was given by Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon who did not consult the cabinet and only casually informed Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett of the order. On October 13, at the meeting with the MAC (Mixed Armistice Commission), the Jordanian representative denounced the attack and promised Israel full cooperation in tracking down the murderers and asked Israel to refrain from retaliation. (From pages 90-93 of The Iron Wall, by Avi Shlaim). Sharett said later that "the Commander of the Jordan Legion, Glubb Pasha, had asked for police blood-hounds to cross over from Israel to track down the Yahud murderers" (Jerusalem Post, October 31, 1965). It is however dubious that serious action against the infiltrators would have been undertaken by the Jordanians, which had never efficiently confronted the issue of infiltrations prior to that.
The Attack
The attack on Qibya took place in the evening of October 14, 1953. The attack began with an intense artillery barrage at the village until the advancing troops had reached the outskirts of the village. Mines were laid out on roads connecting the village to ensure that no succour would reach it. When the village had been cleared of resistance, the soldiers proceeded to lay explosives around the houses and blow them up with the villagers still inside. Those who tried to flee were shoot. An Arab Legion force sent to the region was ambushed, as planned, and killed as well. At dawn the operation was considered completed and the Israeli troops returned home.
All in all, 45 villagers' houses had been destroyed, as well as the mosque, the school and the water reservoir. Between 60 to 70 people were killed, two thirds of them women and children. The rest of the village population, around 2,700 in number, were able to flee. The government of Israel initially claimed that the killing was carried out by Jewish civilians living near the border, but later admitted that it was done by military forces.
The IDF claims that the plan was to ambush Arab Legion forces in the area, by destroying some houses as a decoy [Lexicon]. The original orders issued by the Israeli General Staff were relatively confined in scale, implying "blowing up a number of houses... and hitting the inhabitants". However, going down the command ladder, before they reached the units' commanders, the orders changed to demand "maximum killing" [Morris]. Sharon later wrote in his diary that he received orders to inflict heavy damage on the inhabitants of Qibya. "The orders were utterly clear: Qibya was to be an example for everyone".
Sharon said that he thought the houses were empty and that the unit checked all houses before detonating the explosives. In his autobiography Warrior (1987) he wrote:
- "I couldn't belive my ears. As I went back over each step of the operation, I began to understand what must have happened. For years Israeli reprisal raids had never succeeded in doing more than blowing up a few outlying buildings, if that. Expecting the same, some Arab families must have stayed in their houses rather than running away. In those big stone houses... some could easily have hidden in the cellars and back rooms, keeping quiet when the paratroopers went in to check and yell out a warning. The result was this tragedy that had happened".
Morris expresses doubt in this claim, considering the nature of the orders Unit 101 received. He also points to the fact that US, UN and Arab Legion reports indicates that villagers were killed before the demolition of the houses began.
The UN observer who inspected the scene, Major General Vagn Bennike, chief of staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (which investigated the scene the next day) said: "one story was repeated time after time: the bullet splintered door, the body sprawled across the threshold, indicating that the inhabitants had been forced by heavy fire to stay inside until their homes were blown up over them".
Time Magazine of 26 October 1953 describes the incident in these terms:
- "Then the guardsmen's ammo (25 rounds per man) gave out, and the Israelis moved into Qibya with rifle and Sten guns. They shot every man, woman and child they could find, then turned-their fire on the cattle. After that they dynamited 42 houses, a school and a mosque. The cries of the dying could be heard amid the explosions."
It is unclear, however, whether the magazine's report was based on direct evidence or hearsay, possibly under the influence of bitter Jordanian officials.
Results
The attack had far-reaching consequences. It was widely criticized, not only by the international community but also by Jews in and out of Israel. The U.N. security council condemned Israel in a resolution. Ariel Sharon wrote in his autobiography, that although the civilian casualities were regrettable, after the Qibya operation "it was now clear that Israeli forces were again capable of finding and hitting targets far behind enemy lines". Following the attack, the Arab Legion forces deployed on the border segment near Qibya and allowed no further infiltrations.
Following the attack, the Israeli leadership decided to refrain from directly targeting civilians. It was decided furthermore to cancel the independence of Unit 101, which however continued to participate in retaliatory attacks against military targets as a part of the 202nd Paratroop Brigade.
See also
External links
- UN security council Resolution on Qibya operation
- S/636/Rev.1 16 November 1953
- Interviews with several of the survivors
Sources
- [Morris] Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 278
- [Lexicon] Ze'ev Shchiff, Israel Army Lexicon