Khalid al-Mihdhar

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Khalid al-Mihdhar
Born
Khalid al-Mihdhar (in Arabic: خالد المحضار)

(1975-04-20)April 20, 1975
Mecca, Saudi Arabia
DiedSeptember 11, 2001(2001-09-11) (aged 26)
The Pentagon, Arlington, VA
Other namesSannan al-Makki, Khalid bin Muhammad, Addallah al-Mihdhar, and Khalid Mohammad al-Saqaf

Khalid al-Mihdhar (Arabic: خالد المحضار, also transliterated Almihdhar) (May 16 1975 – September 11 2001) was one of five terrorists named by the FBI as hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77, which was crashed into the Pentagon in the September 11 attacks.

Al-Mihdhar was the first hijacker shown to have some connection to Osama bin Laden, when it was discovered that he had attended a meeting with a suspect in the USS Cole bombing who had been identified by the FBI as one of bin Laden's top security officials.

Background

Born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, he went with Nawaf al-Hazmi (another 9/11 hijacker) to Bosnia in 1995 to join the Bosnian Muslims in their war against Bosnian Serbs.[1] In 1997, both men caught the attention of Saudi intelligence, who believed they were involved in arms smuggling, and the following year were again eyed as possible collaborators in the United States embassy bombings.[2]

Afterwards, both men returned to Afghanistan along with Nawaf's brother Salem, joined al-Qaeda, and fought against the Afghan Northern Alliance. According to al-Mihdhar's family, he fought with Chechnyan Muslims in 1998.

Selected for 9/11 plot

In Spring 1999, when Osama bin Laden committed to the "planes" operation, Khalid al-Mihdhar was among the first group of participants selected for the plot, and was originally slated to be a pilot. Mihdhar was selected by Bin Laden, along with fellow Saudi Nawaf al-Hazmi, and two Yemenis. Mihdhar was so eager to participate in jihad operations in the United States, that he had already obtained a new passport on April 6, 1999, and the following day gone to the consulate in Jeddah and received a one-year B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) multiple-entry visa to the United States,[1][3][4] listing the Los Angeles Sheraton as his intended destination.[5]

Once selected, both were sent to the Mes Aynak training camp in Afghanistan for elite training. Then, in late 1999, Hazmi and the two Yemenis went to Karachi in Pakistan to see Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who instructed them on western culture and travel. However, Mihdhar did not go with them to Karachi.[1]

During a 1999 meeting in Riyadh, the Saudi Intelligence service notified CIA counterparts that Mihdhar and Hazmi were involved with Al-Qaeda. Minister Prince Turki al Faisal has also said that both were put on a Saudi terror watchlist later that year. He also said that he revealed this to the CIA, saying "What we told them was these people were on our watch list from previous activities of al-Qaeda".[2] The CIA strongly denies having received any such warning.[6][7]

Malaysia summit

In late 1999, the NSA picked up a conversation, while tracking the communications of al-Mihdhar's father-in-law Ahmed al-Hada, which mentioned an upcoming meeting in Malaysia involving "Khalid", "Nawaf", and "Salem",[7] and informed the CIA.

On January 4 2000, Mihdhar left Yemen and flew to Dubai where he spent the night. However, the CIA broke into his hotel room and made a photocopy of his passport which gave them his full name, birth information and passport number for the first time; and also alerted them that he held the entry visa to the United States.[3] The photocopy was sent to the CIA's Alec Station,[7] and the NSA began considering al-Mihdhar "in [its] sights".[8]

The following day, Midhar met with Hazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash, and Abu Bara who were all arriving from Pakistan, and together the group traveled to Kuala Lumpur in order to meet with Hambali at the 2000 Al Qaeda Summit.[1][5]

In Malaysia, the group stayed with Yazid Sufaat, a local member of Jemaah Islamiyah, who provided accommodations at request of Hambali. During the meeting, key details of the attacks may have been arranged. At this point, the plot still included an East Asian component, but that was later dropped for the sake of simplicity.[1] Both Mihdhar and Hazmi were secretly photographed at the meeting by Malaysian authorities, alerted by the CIA, who reported that Mihdhar spoke at length with Tawfiq bin Attash, one of the Yemenis, and others who were later involved in the USS Cole bombing.[7] After the meeting, Mihdhar and Hazmi traveled to Bangkok in Thailand on January 8, and left a week later on January 15 to travel to the United States.[5]

United States

File:HotelAddress.jpg
New York ID listing a Ramada Inn address

On January 15, 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived together at Los Angeles International Airport from Bangkok, and were admitted for a six-month period.[4] Immediately after entering the country, Nawaf and al-Mihdhar met Omar al-Bayoumi in an airport restaurant. Al-Bayoumi claims he was merely being charitable in helping the two seemingly out-of-place Muslims to move to San Diego where he helped them find an apartment near his own, co-signed their lease, and gave them $1500 to help pay their rent.[9]

In the beginning of February 2000, Mihdhar and Hazmi rented an apartment at the Parkwood Apartments complex in the Clairemont Mesa section of San Diego. In February, Mihdhar purchased a used 1988 Toyota Corolla.[5] While living at the Parkwood Apartments, neighbors thought that Mihdhar and Hazmi were odd. Months passed without them getting any furniture for the apartment. Instead, the men slept on mattresses on the floor, yet, they carried briefcases, were on their mobile phones, and were occasionally picked up by a limousine.[10] After the attacks, their neighbors told the media that the pair constantly played flight simulator games.[11]

Mihdhar and Hazmi took flight lessons on May 5 at the Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego, with Mihdhar flying an aircraft for 42 minutes. They took additional lessons on May 10 at the Sorbi Flying Club.[5] However, their English skills were very poor, and they did not do well with flight lessons. Mihdhar and Hazmi raised some suspicion when they offered extra money to their flight instructor, Richard Garza, if he would train them to fly jets. Suspicious of the two men, Garza refused the offer but did not report them to authorities.[10] Garza described the two men as "impatient students" who "wanted to learn to fly jets, specifically Boeings."[12]

Mihdhar and Hazmi moved out of Parkwood Apartments at the end of May 2000, and Mihdhar transferred registration for the Toyota Corolla to Hazmi.[5] On June 10, 2000, Mihdhar left the United States and returned to Yemen to visit his wife against the wishes of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who wanted him to remain in the United States helping Nawaf adapt.[4][13] According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was so angered by this that he decided to remove Mihdhar from the 9/11 plot, but he was overruled by Osama bin Laden.[14]

On October 12, The USS Cole was bombed by a small boat laden with explosives. After the bombing, Yemeni Prime Minister Abdul Karim al-Iryani would report that al-Mihdhar had been one of the key planners of the attack, and had been in the country at the time of the attack.[15] In late 2000, Mihdhar was back in Saudi Arabia, staying with a cousin in Mecca.[14]

2001

Mihdhar returned to Afghanistan in February 2001, where he stayed for a few months. The 9/11 Commission, citing intelligence reports, suggested that Mihdhar may have entered Afghanistan, via Iran, having traveled there on a flight from Syria. On June 10, 2001, Mihdhar went back to Saudi Arabia for a month.[14]

On July 4, 2001, Mihdhar returned to the United States, arriving at New York City's John F. Kennedy Airport.[14] Mihdhar traveled back to United States, using the controversial Visa Express program to re-enter the country. His application indicated that he intended to live temporarily at a Marriott hotel in New York City, though Mihdhar ended up spending only one night in a different hotel in the city.[14] When he was admitted to the United States, the immigration inspector noted that Mihdhar had a new passport, which he obtained the previous month.[4]

Mihdhar obtained a USA ID card on July 10, using the address of a Ramada Inn in New York City as his address. In early August, Mihdhar, along with several other hijackers, obtained an identification card in Virginia.[4]

Mihdhar, along with at least five other future hijackers, traveled to Las Vegas at least six times in the Summer of 2001. They reportedly drank alcohol, gambled, and paid strippers to perform lap dances for them.[16]

In August, al-Mihdhar moved to Laurel, Maryland.[citation needed] On August 21, he was placed on the CIA's "terrorist watchlist".[15] Two days later, Israeli Mossad reportedly gave his name to the CIA as part of a list of 19 names they believed were planning an attack in the near future. Only four of the names are known for certain - Nawaf, Atta, Marwan and al-Mihdhar.[17] On the same day, he is added to an INS watchlist, together with Nawaf to prevent entry into the U.S. The next day, both al-Mihdhar and Moqed tried to purchase flight tickets from the American Airlines online ticket-merchant, but had technical difficulties resolving their address and gave up.[18]

The attacks

File:Dulles khalidalmihdhar.jpg
Security Camera still picture of Khalid al-Mihdhar going through security at Dulles Airport

Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar purchased their plane tickets online using a credit card with their real names. This raised no red flags, since the FAA had not been informed that the two were on a terrorist watchlist.[19][20]

On September 10, 2001, Hanjour, al-Mihdhar, and al-Hazmi checked into the Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia where Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, a prominent Saudi government official, was staying - although no evidence was ever uncovered that they had met, or knew of each other's presence.[citation needed]

On September 11, al-Mihdhar and four other hijackers boarded American Airlines flight 77. Al-Mihdhar was randomly selected for extra screening, but nothing suspicious was found in his bags. Some time after takeoff, the plane was hijacked, and was flown into the Pentagon at 9:37 am, killing 189 people.[citation needed]

Aftermath

After the attacks, reports began emerging saying that al-Mihdhar was still alive. On September 19, the FDIC distributed a "special alert" which listed al-Mihdhar as alive.[21] The Justice Department later claimed this was a typo.[citation needed] On 23 September, 2001, the BBC reported that there were "suggestions" that al-Mihdhar might still have been alive.[22] Der Spiegel later investigated the claims of "living" hijackers by the BBC and discovered them to be cases of mistaken identities.[23] In 2002, Saudi Arabia stated that the names of the hijackers were in fact correct.[24]

A digital copy of Mihdhar's passport was recovered during a search of an al-Qaeda safehouse in Afghanistan, which held an 'indicator', implying that Mihdhar was a member of a known terrorist group.[25]

In 2005, Army Lt. Col. Kevin Shaffer and Congressman Curt Weldon alleged that the Defense Department data mining project Able Danger had kept al-Mihdhar, Mohammed Atta, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Marwan al-Shehhi all under surveillance as al-Qaeda agents.[26]

Ahmed al_Darbi, the brother-in-law of al-Mihdhar, was captured by American forces and sent to Guantanamo Bay on charges of providing support to terrorists.[27]

Intelligence reports

On August 28, the New York branch of the FBI requested a case be opened "to determine if al-Mihdhar is still in the United States", but were refused.[citation needed] One FBI agent sent an e-mail saying, "Whatever has happened to this, someday someone will die, and. . . the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems.'"[28][29], and after the attacks would reportedly shout "This is the same Almihdhar we've been talking about for three months!"[30]

The FBI preliminary investigation requested al-Mihdhar's July Visa application from the INS, which indicated he intended to stay at a NYC Marriott. The FBI subsequently assigned an agent to check registrations at all local Marriotts, and on September 5 the agent reports that al-Mihdhar is not registered at any.[31] Five days later, one day before the attacks, the New York office requested that the Los Angeles FBI office check all local Sheraton Hotels, and began checking Lufthansa and United Airlines bookings since those were the two airlines used to enter the country.[31]

References

  1. ^ a b c d e "Chapter 5". 9/11 Commission Report. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
  2. ^ a b FOX News, Saudis, US disclose intel operations on Terror, October 16 2003
  3. ^ a b Strasser, Steven. "The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission : Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11 : Testimony from Fourteen Key Witnesses, Including Richard Clarke, George Tenet, and Condoleezza Rice", 2004. p. 395
  4. ^ a b c d e "9/11 and Terrorist Travel" (PDF). Staff Report. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 2004. Retrieved 2008-09-26.
  5. ^ a b c d e f Federal Bureau of Investigation (February 4, 2008). "Hijackers' Timeline" (PDF). 9/11 Myths. Retrieved 2008-08-01.
  6. ^ Did the Saudis know about 9/11? - Salon.com
  7. ^ a b c d Wright, Lawrence (July 10, 2006). "Did the CIA Stop an FBI Detective from Preventing 9/11". The New Yorker.
  8. ^ CNEWS, "NSA Knew About 9/11 Hijackers Two Years Before Attacks,", July 23, 2003
  9. ^ Iskioff, Michael and Evan Thomas (2002-12-02). "The Saudi Money Trail". Newsweek.
  10. ^ a b Aust, Stefan and Der Spiegel (2002). Inside 9-11. MacMillan. pp. p. 17-18. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
  11. ^ McGeary, Johanna and David Van Biema (2001-09-24). "The New Breed of Terrorist". TIME Magazine.
  12. ^ Helmore, Edward and Ed Vulliamy (2001-10-07). "Saudi hijacker 'was key link to bin Laden'". The Observer.
  13. ^ Substitution for the Testimony of KSM at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui
  14. ^ a b c d e "Chapter 7". 9/11 Commission Report. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
  15. ^ a b Smith, Paul J. "Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia", 2005 ISBN 0765614332 pp. 60
  16. ^ Agents of terror leave their mark on Sin City / Las Vegas workers recall the men they can't forget
  17. ^ BBC, Report details US 'intelligence failures'
  18. ^ Statement of Robert S. Mueller: Joint Investigation Into September 11: (published September 26, 2002)
  19. ^ 'Watch List' Didn't Get to Airline
  20. ^ http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/2002/senatecommittee092602.html
  21. ^ http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/inactivefinancial/2001/fil0179a.html
  22. ^ BBC NEWS | Middle East | Hijack 'suspects' alive and well
  23. ^ Cover Story: Panoply of the Absurd - 2 - International - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News
  24. ^ http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200202/06/eng20020206_90055.shtml
  25. ^ Chapter 2- Chronology
  26. ^ Washington Times, Able Danger questions, August 21 2005
  27. ^ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Guantanamo Detainee Charged (ISN 768), December 21, 2007
  28. ^ http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/2002/senatecommittee092002.html
  29. ^ http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/2002/senatecommittee092002b.html
  30. ^ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46461-2002Sep20.html
  31. ^ a b www.senate.gov - This page cannot be found

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