Tibetan sovereignty debate

Tibet was once an independent kingdom, which later became a part of China. The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Government of Tibet in Exile, however, disagree over when Tibet became a part of China, and whether this incorporation into China is legitimate according to international law.

The view of the Chinese Governments

Political map of Asia in 1890, showing Tibet as part of China (Qing Dynasty). The map was published in the Meyers Konversations-Lexikon in Leipzig in 1892.

A Rand McNally map appended to the 1914 edition of The New Student's Reference Work shows Tibet as part of the Republic of China (1912-). The Chinese government insists that Tibet's political subordination to the Chinese nation predates the establishment of the People's Republic of China (1949-).

The government of Republic of China (ROC) which ruled mainland China from 1912-1949 (and now subsisting in Taiwan) had cabinet level Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in charge of administration of Tibet and Mongolia regions since 1912. The Commission retained its cabinet level status after 1949, but no longer executes that function. The Commission released a statement on the 2008 Tibetan unrest. On 10 May 1943, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek asserted that "Tibet is part of Chinese territory... No foreign nation is allowed to interfere in our domestic affairs". He again declared in 1946 that the Tibetans were Chinese. ROC still claims sovereignty over Tibet and Mongolia in its Constitution today. Ma Ying-jeou, who was elected President of the ROC on 22 March, 2008, said during the presidential election: "We support Tibetan autonomy and respect Tibetan religious beliefs and customs." The government of the PRC contends that China had control over Tibet since the Yuan Dynasty(1271 – 1368).

In the late 19th century, China adopted the Western model of nation-state diplomacy and a series of treaties regarding Tibet's boundaries and status were concluded. Chinese government sources consider this a sign of sovereignty rather than suzerainty.

Historical Facts From Non-Chinese Sources

The 1912 edition of the Catholic Encyclopedia states that

During the eighteenth century the Chinese Emperor, K'ien-lung [i.e.Qianlong], began to establish his supremacy over Tibet; already in 1725 two high Chinese commissioners had been appointed to control the temporal affairs of the country, and in 1793 an imperial edict ordered that future Dalai Lamas were to be chosen from the names of children drawn from a "golden urn".

The secular administration of Tibet includes a council (ka hia) of four ministers (kalon or kablon) of the third rank of Chinese officials, elected as a rule by the Peking government, on presentation by the Chinese amban...there are six military commanders (taipêng), with the fourth degree of Chinese rank.

The Chinese administration of Tibet includes an imperial resident (chu tsang ta ch'ên) or amban (ngang pai) with an assistant resident (pang pan ta ch'ên)...The imperial resident is Chao Ehr-fung (appointed March, 1908)

The same Catholic Encyclopedia under the subheading "Relations with China, Russia, and England" lists a long list of treaties China signed on matters regarding Tibet.

The September 1903 issue of National Geographic tells us that the power of Dalai Lama was only nominal:

Since the fifteenth century all power, civil and spiritual, has been nominally in the hands of the Dalai Lama, but China maintains a Manchu resident and an army. Until the Dalai Lama’s 22 year, the government is in the hands of a regent appointed by the Emperor of China. In order to avoid strife in selecting a Dalai Lama, the electoral council places three strips of paper with the names of three boys in an urn, and the Manchu resident removes one with a small staff. The dalai lama’s council, in whose hands is the actual power, embraces four so-called “Galons” appointed by the Emperor of China. The administration is in the hands of a closed aristocracy, and bribery and corruption are nearly universal.

The 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica traces Chinese dominion over Tibet all the way back to Mongol-ruled China i.e. the Yuan Dynasty, continuing to the Ming Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty:

Kublai Khan conquered all the east of Tibet...Kublai invested Phagspa with sovereign power over (1) Tibet proper, comprising the thirteen districts of U and Tsang, (2) Khalil and (3) Amdo. From this time the Sakya-pa lamas became the universal rulers of Tibet...[Later, Chyang Chub Gyaltshan] subdued Tibet proper and Kham… and with the approval of the court of Peking established a dynasty...When the Mongol dynasty of China passed away, the Mings confirmed and enlarged the dominion of the Tibetan rulers, recognizing at the same time the chief lamas of the eight principal monasteries of the country…During the minority of the fifth (really the third) Dalai Lama, when the Mongol king Tengir To… intervened in the affairs of the country, the Pan-ch'en Lo-sang Ch'o-kyi Gyal-ts'ang lama ... then applied for help to the first [Qing Dynasty] Manchu emperor of China, who had just ascended the throne...The Chinese government in 1653 confirmed the Dalai Lama in his authority, and he paid a visit to the emperor at Peking. The Mongol Khoshotes in 1706 and the Sungars in 1717 interfered again in the succession of the Dalai lama, but the Chinese army finally conquered the country in 1720, and the present system of government was established...

The Qing Dynasty Chinese rule over the Tibet was uninterrupted in the next centuries:

In 1872-1873 some attempt was made by Indian officials to open up trade with Tibet…in 1886 a mission was organized to proceed to Lhasa. The Chinese… granted a passport to this mission...In 1890 a treaty was concluded, and trade regulations under this treaty in 1893; but the negotiations were carried on with the Chinese authorities... [In 1908] The Dalai Lama was now summoned to Peking, where he obtained the imperial authority to resume his administration…the Chinese amban in Lhasa …summoned the Chinese troops to enter the city. They did so, and the Dalai Lama fled to India in February 1910…and he was deposed by imperial decree.

According to historian Zahiruddin Ahmad, since at least the 18th century, when the Qing Government was setting up its local government structure and promulgated laws for the governing, Beijing has, in the words of a foreign missionary who witnessed, had "absolute dominion over Tibet".

The Chinese Resident Ministers in Tibet, namely Ambans, were bestowed power which, according to the Imperial Ordinance promulgated in 1793, was on a par with the local spiritual leaders of Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas. The Ambans, according to the Ordinance, were in absolute charge of financial, diplomatic, and trade matters.

According to an online article by the Tibetologist Melvyn C. Goldstein:

The 1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention reaffirmed the Chinese overlord position in Tibet. In 1907, an Anglo-Russian treaty internationalized this treaty.

The [British] invasion of Tibet and the Lhasa Convention of 1904 dramatically altered Chinese policy toward Tibet. Until then, the Qing Dynasty had evinced no interest in directly administering or Sinicizing Tibet...Beijing got the British troops to leave Tibetan...Britain's casual invasion of Tibet, therefore, stimulated China to protect what it felt were its national interests in Tibet by beginning a program to integrate Tibet culturally, economically, and politically more closely with the rest of China.

[The Dalai Lama] had been "deposed" by the Chinese Government in 1904...In 1908, he went to Beijing to visit the Emperor and Court. Arguing that the amban did not faithfully transmit his views to Beijing, the Dalai Lama requested permission to petition the throne directly (i.e., to bypass the amban)...[In 1910] China again deposed the Dalai Lama and expanded its efforts to expand its real control in Tibet...

The "Patron-Priest" relationship (Tibetan: chöyön, Wylie: mchod-yon) held between the Chinese central authorities and the Tibetan local governments was not equal at all but rather one of superior to inferior. The 13th Dalai Lama, for example, knelt before the Empress Dowager and the young Emperor while he delivered his petition in Beijing. And he was awarded the humiliating title of "Loyally Submissive Vice-Regent", and ordered to follow China's commands and to communicate with the Emperor only through the Chinese Amban in Lhasa.

Legal arguments based on historical status

The position of the PRC, which has ruled mainland China since 1949, as well as the official position of the Republic of China, which ruled mainland China before 1949 and currently controls Taiwan , is that Tibet has been an indivisible part of China de jure since the Yuan Dynasty of (Mongol-ruled China) seven hundred years ago , comparable to other states such as the Kingdom of Dali and the Tangut Empire that were also incorporated into the Middle Kingdom at the time and have remained in China ever since. The PRC contends that according to the Succession of states theory in international law all subsequent Chinese governments (Ming Dynasty, Qing Dynasty, ROC and PRC) have succeeded the Yuan Dynasty in exercising de jure sovereignty and de facto power over Tibet.

Unique ethnicity

According to the current government, successive Chinese governments have recognized Tibet as having its own unique culture and language; however, they believe that this situation, does not necessarily militate in favor of independence, because China itself has over 56 unique ethnic groups and is one of many multi-national states in the world.

De facto independence

The ROC government had indeed no effective control over Tibet from 1912 to 1951; however, in the opinion of the Chinese government, this condition does not represent Tibet's complete independence as many other parts of China also enjoyed de facto independence when the Chinese nation was torn by warlordism, Japanese invasion, and civil war . While at times, the Tibetans were fiercely independent-minded, at other times, Tibet indicated its willingness to accept subordinate status as part of China provided that Tibetan internal systems were left untouched and provided China relinquished control over a number of important ethnic Tibetan groups in Kham and Amdo . China insists that during this period the ROC government continued to maintain sovereignty over Tibet. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1912) stipulated that Tibet was a province of the Republic of China. Stipulations concerning Tibet in the Constitution of the Republic of China promulgated later all stressed that Tibet is an inseparable part of Chinese territory, and the Central Government of China exercises sovereignty in Tibet. In 1927, the Commission in Charge of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs of the the Chinese Government consisted of members of great influence in the Mongolian and Tibetan areas, such as the 9th Panchen Lama, the 13th Dalai Lama and other Tibetan government representatives. The 9th Panchen Lama who ruled over one-third of Tibet accepted an honorific title and a high government position from China; the 13th Dalai Lama was bestowed more honors and Tibetans were sent as congressmen of the central government.On 1 February 1925 the Panchen Lama attended the preparatory session of the "National Reconstruction Meeting" (Shanhou huiyi) meant to identify ways and means of unifying the Chinese nation, and gave a speech about achieving the unification of five nationalities, including Tibetans, Mongolians and Han Chinese. He spent his time preaching from monasteries to monasteries in inland China (outside of Tibet) from 1924 till his death on 1 December 1937. Throughout the Kuomintang years, no country gave Tibet diplomatic recognition . Delegates from Tibetan areas attended the Drafting Committee for a new constitution of the Republic of China in 1925, the National Assembly of the Republic of China in 1931; the fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1931; and a National Assembly for drafting a new Chinese constitution in 1946. A "Trade Mission" sent by the Tibetan government attended another National Assembly for drafting a new Chinese constitution in 1948.

The approval of the Kuomintang government was needed to validate the choice of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. When the current 14th Dalai Lama was first installed in Lhasa, it was with an armed escort of Chinese troops and an attending Chinese minister, in accordance with centuries-old tradition. The Calcutta Statesman and the The Times reported then that the Chinese were somehow essential to the recognition of a legitimate Dalai Lama. The Chinese minister Wu Chung-hsin conducted the Dalai Lama to his throne, and read out a proclamation, and the Dalai Lama made obeisance towards Beijing.

According to Yu Shiyu, during China's resistance war against Japanese invasion, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ordered Ma Bufang, Governor of Qinghai (1937-1949), to repair the Yushu airport at Qinghai Province to deter Tibet independence.

Regarding Tibet’s assertion of its independence status before its "invasion" by People's Liberation Army, Goldstein documents the response of the India Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nehru, 8 September 1950:

Nehru responded bluntly: "The Government of India will continue the policy of the British period in considering Tibet outwardly a part of China but internally independent... ["Shakabpa wrote 'internally independent' but Nehru certainly said 'internally autonomous'," according to Goldstein in footnote 86, and the Tibetans' response following]." The Tibetans replied: "Because Tibet is independent please do not talk about 'internal autonomy' under China..." Nehru was a bit irritated by this and reply sharply to the Tibetans that it was not enough to speak about Tibet independence: such status had to be proved according to the law. [And Nehru rejected the Tibetan’s legal reasoning based on non-existent "separate treaty" between Britain and Tibet in the Simla Convention of 1904. Nehru then replied to the Tibetans]: "There is no separate treaty like this and China never accepted the Simla Convention. The Chinese believe that Tibet is a part of China. Tibet thinks that because China didn’t accept Simla, it is independent but at that time Tibet did not make any clear decision. That was a mistake. And later when you had the time and the opportunity to do something [about "independence"] you did nothing and this was a mistake. During this period China has been very clever and have proclaimed widely in the internationally community that Tibet is part of China...

Nehru advised the [Tibetan Yatung delegation who were about to negotiate with Beijing in April 1951] to admit that Tibet was a part of China, since it was seen as such in the eyes of the world. He also told them they would probably have to agree to Chinese control over Tibet's foreign relations...

Foreign interventions

Finally, the PRC considers all pro-independence movements aimed at ending Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, including British attempts to establish control in the late 19th century and early 20th century , the CIA's backing of Tibetan insurgents during the 1950s and 1960s, and the Government of Tibet in Exile today, as one long campaign abetted by malicious Western imperialism aimed at destroying Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty, or destabilizing China, thereby weakening China's position in the world .

Shen Jirao writes on China Tibet Information Center website:

From 1913 to 1914, China was forced to send delegates to attend the tripartite conference at Simla...When the British failed to achieve their goal at one step, they decided to do it in two steps. Responding to the fact that Mongolia was divided into Inner and Outer Mongolia following the Russian invasion, the British attempted to divide the areas inhabited by the Tibetans into "outer Tibet" which was Tibet, and "inner Tibet" which was composed of areas inhabited by the Tibetans in the four provinces neighboring Tibet. China would administer "inner Tibet" for the time being, but refrain from meddling with the affairs of "outer Tibet" which would follow the system of autonomy. The British controlled "outer Tibet" in a short period of time, and those who stood for "Tibetan independence" lauded the British occupation as "Tibetan autonomy" and even a period of "Tibetan independence".

Following the Simla Conference, the British supported the pro-British elements on the upper ruling class in Tibet in a big way, and incited the Tibetan army to invade Sichuan and Qinghai. In 1920, the British troops invaded Tibet, and sow bad blood between Lhasa and Beijing...

The British Foreign Office's report titled Tibet and the Issue on China's "Suzerainty", issued in March 1943, proposed depriving China of its suzerainty over Tibet. Fearing that China would resort to force, the British Foreign Office consulted with the Indian Affairs Office and decided not to do that.

Tibetologist Melvyn C. Goldstein writes about CIA involvement in Tibet -- when Ma Zedong was cutting down his military presence -- leading up to the uprising against Chinese rule in the 1950s:

Moreover, by 1956 the U.S. was encouraging the anti-Chinese faction, and in 1957, actually started to train and arm Tibetan guerrillas. Mao... reduced the number of Han cadre and troops in Tibet...the [1959] Tibetan rebellion also failed dismally...The CIA subsequently assisted the guerrillas in establishing a safe-haven base of operations in northern Nepal...

The New York Times commented on the American policy during the Cold War:

The decade-long covert program to support the Tibetan independence movement was part of the C.I.A.'s worldwide effort to undermine Communist governments, particularly in the Soviet Union and China.

The American Tibetologist Tom Grunfeld writes that during The Cold War:

From exile, the Dalai Lama oversaw refugee resettlement and guerrilla warfare—although he officially renounced all violence. CIA support encouraged insurgent Tibetans to continue their war for independence, but the CIA was more interested in harassing communist China than in promoting Tibetan independence.

And after the Cold War:

While officially recognizing Tibet as part of China, the U.S. Congress and White House unofficially encourage the campaign for independence.

According to Michael Parenti, the US continues its policy of interference in Tibetan affairs today:

Throughout the 1960s, the Tibetan exile community was secretly pocketing $1.7 million a year from the CIA...Into the twenty-first century, via the National Endowment for Democracy and other conduits that are more respectable sounding than the CIA, the U.S. Congress continued to allocate an annual $2 million to Tibetans in India, with additional millions for “democracy activities” within the Tibetan exile community.

Much of the NED's fund goes to Tibet independence support groups. This "democracy" promotion invites suspicion. According to Michael Barker:

the NEDs first acting president, observed that in fact “A lot of what we [the NED] do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA”...it appears that the NED was envisaged by US foreign policy elites to be a more suitable way to provide strategic funding to nongovernmental organizations than via covert CIA funding...Barker (2006) has illustrated the NED’s anti-democratic involvement in facilitating and manipulating the ‘colour revolutions’ which recently swept across Eastern Europe...the NED’s activities are intimately linked with those of the CIA. This article has demonstrated the close ties that exist between the Dalai Lama’s non-violent campaign for Tibetan independence and U.S. foreign policy elites who are actively supporting Tibetan causes through the NED...the overwhelmingly anti-democratic nature of the NED can only weaken the legitimacy of the claims of any group associated with the NED.

F. William Engdahl writes:

Washington has obviously decided on an ultra-high risk geopolitical game with Beijing's by fanning the flames of violence in Tibet just at this sensitive time in their relations and on the run-up to the Beijing Olympics. It's part of an escalating strategy of destabilization of China which has been initiated by the Bush Administration over the past months, and which includes the attempt to ignite an anti-China Saffron Revolution in the neighboring Myanmar region...The background actors in the Tibet actions confirm that Washington has been working overtime in recent months to prepare another of its infamous Color Revolutions...As in the other recent Color Revolutions... the US Government is fanning the flames of destabilization against China by funding opposition protest organizations inside and outside Tibet through its arm, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)...In short, US State Department and US intelligence community finger prints are all over the upsurge around the Free Tibet movement and the attacks of March...and NED operations embodied a series of 'democratic' or soft coup projects as part of a larger strategy which would strategically cut China off from access to its vital external oil and gas reserves.

Tom Grunfeld also writes:

U.S. public diplomacy skirts the independence issue, focusing on criticism of human rights abuses. Yet recent concessions and overtures to the Tibet Lobby are seen as evidence by CCP hard-line factions that Washington’s ultimate goal is to fracture China.

The German-Foreign-Policy.com writes:

Berlin is using the upheaval in the western region of the People's Republic of China to pursue its campaign of attrition against Beijing...Supporting extensive autonomy rights for Tibet and even its secession is in line with the traditional German East Asia policy. Already in the 1930s and 1940s, Berlin considered this region to be an important base for expanding its influence toward China. Since the mid 1980s, Germany has been reviving this strategy, and organizations of German "Volksgruppen" (ethnic group) policy are among those actively promoting a "free Tibet". The secessionist policy is also aimed at other vast regions of China (Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang). Fearing its future power, Berlin is seeking to weaken its ascending East Asian rival. Last fall, german-foreign-policy.com published a series of special reports on the history and presence of German Tibet policy. Because of the current events we are providing free access to those analyses over the next few weeks. Click here to find Strategies of Attrition...

Human Rights

Genocide Charges

Some pro-Tibet groups claims the death toll in Tibet since the 1950 People's Liberation Army invasion of Tibet to be 1,200,000 and has filed official charges of genocide against prominent Chinese leaders and officials. This figure has been disputed by Patrick French, a supporter of the Tibetan cause who was able to view the data and calculations:

Some [pro-Tibet groups] use questionable information. For example, the Free Tibet Campaign in London (of which I am a former director) and other groups have long claimed that 1.2 million Tibetans have been killed by the Chinese since they invaded in 1950. However, after scouring the archives in Dharamsala while researching my book on Tibet, I found that there was no evidence to support that figure.

Other Rights

PRC argues that the Tibetan authority under successive Dalai Lamas was itself a human rights violator while the old society was basically a serfdom and, according to foreigners who witnessed it, slaves even existed.

This is how Michael Parenti describes the human rights condition in old Tibet:

The majority of the rural population were serfs...the serfs went without schooling or medical care...under a lifetime bond to work...without pay...torture and mutilation--including eye gouging, the pulling out of tongues, hamstringing, and amputation--were favored punishments inflicted upon thieves, and runaway or resistant serfs.

The Tibetologist Robert Barnett wrote about the violent tendencies of powerful monks against the introduction of anything un-Buddhist that might diminish their hold to power:

The clergy who destroyed the attempts of the Tibetan government and the previous Dalai Lama to enlarge and modernize the Tibetan army in the 1920s...were not motivated in the slightest by objections to violence, but by the fear that modernization might, by increasing links with the un-Buddhist British, lead to the diminution of the monasteries' power; indeed there were several insurgencies against the previous Dalai Lama or his regents this century led by monks in defense of that belief.

And the repressive and violent tendencies of the exile Tibetan community,

Within the exile community itself there is a continuing streak of political intolerance, especially towards those who have made the slightest perceived criticism of the Dalai Lama, who risk beatings or threats of assassination. Neither is religion by any means above conflict: at least two of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism are at present wracked by disputes; both cases have led to murders or threats of murder.

Old Tibet also had a long history of persecuting un-Buddhist Christians. In the years 1630 and 1742, Tibetan Christian communities were suppressed by the lamas of the Gelugpa Sect, whose chief lama was the Dalai Lama. Jesuit priests were made prisoners in 1630, or attacked before they reached Tsaparang. Between 1850 and 1880 eleven fathers of the Paris Foreign Mission Society were murdered in Tibet, or killed or injured during their journeys to other missionary outposts in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands. In 1881 Father Brieux was reported to have been murdered on his way to Lhasa. Qing officials later discovered that the murder cases were in fact covertly supported and even orchestrated by local lamaseries and their patrons -- the native chieftains. In 1904, Qing official Feng Quan sought to curtail the influence of the Gelugpa Sect and ordered the protection of Western missionaries and their churches. Indignation over Feng Quan and the Christian presence escalated to a climax in March 1905, when thousands of the Batang lamas revolted, killing Feng, his entourage, local Manchu and Han Chinese officials, and the local French Catholic priests. The revolt soon spread to other cities in eastern Tibet, such as Chamdo, Litang and Nyarong, and at one point almost spilled over into neighboring Sichuan Province. The missionary stations and churches in these areas were burned and destroyed by the angry Gelugpa monks and local chieftains. Dozens of local Westerners, including at least four priests, were killed or fatally wounded. The scale of the rebellion was so tremendous that only when panicked Qing authorities hurriedly sent 2,000 troops from Sichuan to pacify the mobs did the revolt gradually came to an end. The lamasery authorities and local native chieftains' hostility towards the Western missionaries in Tibet lingered through the last throes of the Manchu dynasty and into the Republican period.

The Dalai Lama himself was accused by a followers of another Tibetan sect for religious intolerance when he banned the worship of Dorje Shugden in 1996.

The three UN resolutions of 1959, 1961, and 1965 condemned human rights violation in Tibet; however, these resolutions were passed at a time when the PRC was not permitted to become a member and of course was not allowed to present its version of events in the region (however, the Republic of China on Taiwan was a member of the UN at the time, and it equally claimed sovereignty over Tibet and opposed Tibetan self-determination). The Tibetologist Grunfeld further notes that:

These resolutions served no practical purpose. None even mentioned China by name, nor did they question the legitimacy of Chinese rule in Tibet (the 1961 resolution did regret, in passing, the deprivation of the right to self-determination)—worded, as they were, solely to express regrets over the alleged abuse of "human rights" in Tibet. The UN's denunciation of those who did not act "reasonably" and "fairly" flew in the face of its own actions of denying the PRC membership during this period. It is hardly surprising that the Chinese government regarded these resolutions with little more than contempt.

Grunfeld comments in another article about Human Rights Watch focusing attention on the individuals who are indeed victims of human rights abuses:

...since this repression is highly selective and not universal, their reports distort the overall picture of what is going on inside Tibet.

Grunfeld also notes that (for 15 years in the 1960s and 1970s):

From exile, the Dalai Lama oversaw refugee resettlement and guerrilla warfare—although he officially renounced all violence.

The Tibetologist Robert Barnett summed up the "human rights" agenda as perceived by China and the developing world and the United Nations unwillingness to condemn China:

The unfortunate history of the Tibet issue, used by the Western powers, and by the United States in particular, in the 1950s and 1960s as part of their cold war strategy to destabilize China, has fueled the perception that criticism of Beijing's role in Tibet is a device raised by westerners to attack China in particular and developing countries in general. This has enabled Beijing to rally support from the developing world and led to the collapse of the last nine attempts at the United Nations to criticize China's human rights practices.

The Chinese government insists that the Tibet question is not about human rights, but about territorial integrity and unity of the State. On 12 April 2008, the Chinese President Hu Jintao told Australia's Prime Minister Mr Kevin Rudd:

Our conflict with the Dalai clique is not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, nor a human rights problem. It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland.

Robert Barnett described:

The Tibetan activists inside Tibet have rarely (until recently) incorporated the issue of human rights in their protests or slogans—the language of human rights is largely a facet of exile rhetoric and Western simplification of the issue. Inside Tibet, the demands raised in wall posters have focused more on independence: rightly or wrongly, that has been to them the central issue.

It is about restraining the "splitist" or separatist activities of the Tibet independence forces from within and without China, many of them -- especially leaders of the Tibetan Youth Congress which claims 30,000 over members -- advocating violence.

Robert Barnett wrote about this danger in 1998:

Today some ten thousand Tibetans are members of India's military forces, soldiers with a special aptitude for high-altitude warfare, posing a threat that China views with some seriousness. Neither is the level of political violence among Tibetans as low as some Western reports would suggest: at least seven bombs exploded in Tibet between 1995 and 1997, one of them laid by a monk, and a significant number of individual Tibetans are known to be actively seeking the taking up of arms; hundreds of Chinese soldiers and police have been beaten during demonstrations in Tibet, and at least one killed in cold blood, probably several more.

Chinadaily.com reported on the discovery of weapons subsequent to the riots on March 14, 2008:

Police in Lhasa seized more than 100 guns, tens of thousands of bullets, several thousand kilograms of explosives and tens of thousands of detonators, acting on reports from lamas and ordinary people.

And on 23 March, 2008, there was a bombing incident in the Qambo prefecture.

To allow the Tibetan independence movement to grow unrestrained will only lead to violent riots or sabotage or secessionist war between the Tibetan separatists and the central government one day. The State representing the collective will and right of its people to prevent and preempt future catastrophe overrides the "human rights" of a small minority of people to foster unlawful independence that is potentially disastrous for all parties.

Self-determination

While the earliest ROC constitutional documents already claim Tibet as part of China, Chinese political leaders also acknowledged the principle of self-determination. For example, at a party conference in 1924, Kuomintang leader Sun Yat-sen issued a statement calling for the right of self-determination of all Chinese ethnic groups: "The Kuomintang can state with solemnity that it recognizes the right of self-determination of all national minorities in China and it will organize a free and united Chinese republic." In 1931, the CCP issued a constitution for the short-lived Chinese Soviet Republic which states that Tibetans and other ethnic minorities, "may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it." The possibility of complete secession was denied by Communist leader Mao Zedong in 1938: "They must have the right to self-determination and at the same time they should continue to unite with the Chinese people to form one nation". This policy was codified in PRC's first constitution which, in Article 3, reaffirmed China as a "single multi-national state," while the "national autonomous areas are inalienable parts". The Chinese government insists that the United Nations documents, which codifies the principle of self-determination, provides that the principle shall not be abused in disrupting territorial integrity: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations...."

Legitimacy

The PRC also points to what it claims are the autocratic, oppressive and theocratic policies of the government of Tibet before 1959, its toleration of existence of serfdom and slaves, its renunciation of Arunachal Pradesh which China regards as a part of Tibet occupied by India, and its association with India and other foreign countries, and as such claims the Government of Tibet in Exile has no legitimacy to govern Tibet and no credibility or justification in criticizing PRC's policies.

The People's Liberation Army's march into Tibet in 1951 was not without the support of Tibetan people, including the Panchen Lama. Ian Buruma writes:

...It is often forgotten that many Tibetans, especially educated people in the larger towns, were so keen to modernize their society in the mid-20th century that they saw the Chinese communists as allies against rule by monks and serf-owning landlords. The Dalai Lama himself, in the early 1950s, was impressed by Chinese reforms and wrote poems praising Chairman Mao.

Instances have been documented when the PRC government gained support from a portion of the Tibetan population, including monastic leaders, monks, nobility and ordinary Tibetans prior to the crackdown in the 1959 uprising. The PRC government and some Tibetan leaders characterize PLA's operation as a peaceful liberation of Tibetans from a "feudal serfdom system."(和平解放西藏).

When Tibet complained to the United Nations through El Salvador about China's "invasion" in November 1950 -- after China had captured Chamdo, a city in East Tibet -- members debated about it but refused to admit the Tibet question into the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly. The U.N. only agreed to "adjourn" it, after key stakeholders like India spoke of a possible peaceful settlement. The Russian delegate said that "China's sovereignty over Tibet had been recognized for a long time by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U.S.S.R." Subsequently, the Seventeen Point Agreement was signed between delegates of China and Tibet on 23 May 1951.

The Dalai Lama had ample time and opportunity to denounce the Seventeen Point Agreement. He was encouraged and instigated to do so with promise of public support by the US, which by now had become hostile to Communist-ruled China.

The Agreement was however accepted by Tibet's National Assembly and the Dalai Lama, and on 24 October 1951, the Dalai Lama dispatched a telegram to Mao Zedong:

The Tibet Local Government as well as the ecclesiastic and secular People unanimously support this agreement, and under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Central People's Government, will actively support the People's Liberation Army in Tibet to consolidate defence, drive out imperialist influences from Tibet and safeguard the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the Motherland.

On 28 October 1951, the Panchen Rinpoche [i.e. Panchen Lama] made a similar public statement accepting the agreement. He urged the "people of Shigatse to give active support" to carrying out the agreement.

Tsering Shakya writes about the general acceptance of various sections of Tibetans toward the Seventeen Point Agreement, and its legal significance:

The most vocal supporters of the agreement came from the monastic community...As a result many Tibetans were willing to accept the agreement....Finally there were strong factions in Tibet who felt that the agreement was acceptable...this section was led by the religious community...In the Tibetans' view their independence was not a question of international legal status, but as Dawa Norbu writes, "Our sense of independence was based on the independence of our way of life and culture, which was more real to the unlettered masses than law or history, canons by which the non-Tibetans decide the fate of Tibet...This was the first formal agreement between Tibet and Communist China and it established the legal basis for Chinese rule in Tibet."

Thus, the People's Liberation Army entered Tibet peacefully following the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement.

The view of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile

Flag of Tibet between 1912and 1950. This version was introduced by the 13th Dalai Lama in 1912. It sports two Snowlions amongst other elements and still continues to be used by the Government of Tibet in Exile, but is outlawed in the People's Republic of China.

In 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama fled Tibet and established a government in exile at Dharamsala in northern India. This group claims sovereignty over various ethnically or historically Tibetan areas now governed by China. Aside from the Tibet Autonomous Region, an area that was administered directly by the Dalai Lama's government until 1951, the group also claims Amdo (Qinghai) and eastern Kham (western Sichuan). About 45 percent of China's ethnic Tibetans live in the Tibet Autonomous Region, according to the 2000 census. Prior to 1949, much of Amdo and eastern Kham were governed by local rulers and even warlords.

"During the time of Genghis Khan and Altan Khan of the Mongols, the Ming dynasty of the Chinese, and the Qing Dynasty of the Manchus, Tibet and China cooperated on the basis of benefactor and priest relationship," according to a proclamation issued by 13th Dalai Lama in 1913. The relationship did not imply "subordination of one to the other." He condemned the Chinese authorities for attempting to colonize Tibetan territory in 1910-12. "We are a small, religious, and independent nation," the proclamation states.

The view of the current Dalai Lama is as follows:

During the 5th Dalai Lama's time [1617-1682], I think it was quite evident that we were a separate sovereign nation with no problems. The VIth Dalai Lama [1683-1706] was spiritually pre-eminent, but politically, he was weak and disinterested. He could not follow the Vth Dalai Lama's path. This was a great failure. So, then the Chinese influence increased. During this time, the Tibetans showed quite a deal of respect to the Chinese. But even during these times, the Tibetans never regarded Tibet as a part of China. All the documents were very clear that China, Mongolia and Tibet were all separate countries. Because the Chinese emperor was powerful and influential, the small nations accepted the Chinese power or influence. You cannot use the previous invasion as evidence that Tibet belongs to China. In the Tibetan mind, regardless of who was in power, whether it was the Manchus, the Mongols or the Chinese, the east of Tibet was simply referred to as China. In the Tibetan mind, India and China were treated the same; two separate countries.

The International Commission of Jurists concluded that Tibet in 1913-50 demonstrated the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. In the opinion of the commission, the government of Tibet conducted its own domestic and foreign affairs free from any outside authority, and countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet in practice as an independent State.

The United Nations General Assembly passed resolutions urging respect for the rights of Tibetans in 1959, 1961 and 1965. The 1961 resolution, in the opinion of the Tibetan Government-in-exile, asserts that "principle of self-determination of peoples and nations" applies to the Tibetan people.

The Tibetan Government in Exile views current PRC rule in Tibet as colonial and illegitimate, motivated solely by the natural resources and strategic value of Tibet, and in gross violation of both Tibet's historical status as an independent country and the right of Tibetan people to self-determination. It also points to PRC's autocratic policies, divide-and-rule policies, and what it contends are assimilationist policies, and regard those as an example of ongoing Chinese imperialism aimed at destroying Tibet's distinct ethnic makeup, culture, and identity, thereby cementing it as an indivisible part of China. That said, the Dalai Lama has recently stated that he wishes only for Tibetan autonomy, and not separation from China, under certain democratic conditions, like freedom of speech and expression and genuine self-rule. Another view supported by a number of international groups including the Free Tibet Campaign is that Tibet should be granted total independence from China.

Historical Status

Among the historical claims to Tibetan sovereignty, supporters point to the fact that during the Yuan dynasty, it was the Mongols who conquered Tibet, not the Chinese, and that the Mongols administered Tibet and China separately and very differently, allowing the Tibetans much greater autonomy. Furthermore, Tibet was independent for almost 300 years after the fall of the Mongol empire, from 1349 to 1642, during which time Ming Dynasty nominally granted titles to certain Tibetan officials but effectively exercised no control over Tibetan affairs or over the composition of the Tibetan government.

Although supporters concede Chinese influence increased during the Qing dynasty, they point out that Tibet waged war against Jammu in 1841-1842 and with Nepal in 1854-55 without Chinese assistance, an indication of effective sovereignty.

Third-Party views

Thomas Heberer, a leading China expert in Germany, declared in an article published on April 16, 2008 in the German daily Die Tageszeitung.

No country in the world has ever recognized the independence of Tibet or declared that Tibet is an 'occupied country'. For all countries in the world, Tibet is Chinese territory.

Other Tibetologists write that no country publicly accepts Tibet as an independent state, in spite of several instances of government officials appealing to their superiors to do so. Treaties signed by Britain and Russia in the early years of the twentieth century, and others signed by Nepal and India in the 1950s, recognized Tibet's political subordination to China. The Americans presented their view on 15 May 1943:

For its part, the Government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that...the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government has at no time raised a question regarding either of these claims.

No sovereign states, including India, have extended recognition to the Tibetan Government-in-exile. This lack of legal recognition of independence has forced even some strong supporters of the refugees to admit that:

...even today international legal experts sympathetic to the Dalai Lama's cause find it difficult to argue that Tibet ever technically established its independence of the Chinese Empire, imperial, or republican.

See also

• Tibet
• International Tibet Independence Movement
• South Tibet