Operation Battleaxe

Operation Battleaxe
Part of World War II, Western Desert Campaign
Soldiers of the 4th Indian Division decorate the side of their lorry "Khyber Pass to Hell-Fire Pass".
Date June 15 – June 17, 1941 Location Cyrenaica, Libya Result Operation failure, Axis victory
Belligerents
Afrika Korps Three battalions of Italian Trento Division One Italian artillery regiment	British XIII Corps
Commanders and leaders
Erwin Rommel	Archibald Wavell Noel Beresford-Peirse Arthur Tedder
Strength
13,200 infantry (5,700 Germans, 7,500 Italians) ~196 tanks 130 fighters 84 bombers	20,000+ infantry ~190 tanks 98 fighters 105 bombers
Casualties and losses
1270 casualties 12 tanks 10 aircraft	969 casualties 91 tanks 36 aircraft

Operation Battleaxe, also known as the Battle of Sollum, was a British Army operation during the Second World War in June 1941 with the goal of clearing Eastern Cyrenaica of German and Italian forces; one of the main benefits of this would be the lifting of the siege of Tobruk. It was the first time during the war that a significant German force fought on the defensive.

The operation did not succeed though, as British forces launched their initial assaults against strong defensive positions created by German General Erwin Rommel. The British lost over half of their tanks on the first day and only achieved victory at one of their three thrusts. On the second day, they achieved mixed results, being pushed back on their western flank but repelled a significant German counter-attack in their centre. On the third day, the British narrowly avoided outright disaster by successfully withdrawing just prior to a German encircling movement which would have cut them off from retreat.

The failure of this operation led to the replacement of British General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East.

Prelude

In late March of 1941, soon after the arrival of German forces (Afrika Korps) in Tripoli, Libya, General Erwin Rommel, though ordered to remain on the defensive, quickly captured the British front line position at El Agheila and then went on an offensive which, by mid-April, had reached as far as Sollum, Egypt. The sole remaining Allied position in Libya was the heavily fortified port of Tobruk, which Rommel had surrounded and begun to siege.

Soon after his siege began, Rommel's situation was complicated by the actions of the Royal Air Force. On a nightly basis, RAF Wellington medium bombers would bomb the harbour of Benghazi (Rommel's most forward supply port) while during the day his supply convoys and airfields were attacked by both Wellington's and Blenheim light bombers

On April 20, Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered that a British sea convoy (codenamed Tiger) carrying tanks and fighter aircraft was to take a more direct, and dangerous, route to supply Wavell faster; these forces were then to be used in a major counter-offensive. The German Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), also concerned by Rommel's actions, sent down General Friedrich Paulus to investigate the situation. Paulus, after witnessing one of Rommel's costly failed attempts to assault Tobruk, sent off a report to OKW on May 12 describing Rommel's position as weak, with critical shortages of both fuel and ammunition. In response to this, and with imminent invasion of the Soviet Union, Field Marshall Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German army (Heer), ordered Rommel not to advance further or attack Tobruk again; he was to hold his position and conserve his forces.

Via Ultra intercepts, the British also received Paulus' report and Churchill, believing that one strong push would dislodge German forces, began to increase the pressure on General Wavell to go on the offensive immediately. Wavell soon prepared Operation Brevity, a limited operation with the intention of seizing Sollum and the Halfaya Pass along with Fort Capuzzo, advancing on to Sidi Aziez, then possibly driving on to relieve Tobruk. This operation would also secure a foothold for the larger Operation Bruiser (an early name for Operation Battleaxe) to launch from once equipment from the Tiger convoy arrived and was made available.

On May 12 the Tiger convoy arrived in Alexandria carrying 238 tanks (21 Mark VIC light tanks, 82 cruiser tanks (including 50 of the new Crusaders) and 135 Matilda infantry tanks) and 43 Hawker Hurricane fighters. These tanks arrived with many mechanical faults (including a lack of sand filters for the engines) on arrival and required extensive servicing. They were scheduled for use in rebuilding the 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats), which had been previously dissolved, with the cruiser tanks going to the 7th Armoured Brigade and the infantry tanks going to the 4th Armoured Brigade.

Three days after the arrival of the Tiger convoy, Operation Brevity began and looked initially successful, with Fort Capuzzo and Halfaya Pass captured. Soon after though, Rommel counterattacked and by the 27th had recaptured all the territory that Brevity had won.

By the end of May, the Greek island of Crete had essentially fallen to the Germans. This meant that the German air force (Luftwaffe) would have additional airfields available to threaten Allied shipping in the area and protect supply convoys to their troops in Cyrenaica; delaying the attack could therefore mean facing a stronger German opposition. To offset this, the British Chiefs of Staff stated that it was imperative that control be wrested in the area between Sollum and Derna and British air forces in that region be re-established.

The planning for Battleaxe

British plans

Plan for the initial assault

The contested frontier area of Operation Battleaxe

Initially, three plans were considered for Operation Battleaxe. In the first plan, rejected due to lack of sufficient forces, infantry and heavy infantry tanks were to clear the frontier while the fast cruiser tanks were to make straight for enemy forces besieging Tobruk. The second plan was for the 7th Armoured Division to position itself west of Fort Capuzzo in order to draw out and eliminate the enemy's armoured forces; this plan was rejected since it did not utilize all available Allied forces.

On May 28, Wavell gave his orders for the final plan for Operation Battleaxe. It was to consist of three stages: in the first the enemy was to be defeated on the frontier and the area encompassing Halfaya, Sollum, Capuzzo and Sidi Aziez was to be secured. In the second, the XIII Corps was to push up and secure the area around Tobruk and El Adem. Once this was complete, then the areas of Derna and Mechili were to captured.

In the initial stage, the British forces would advance in a three-prong assault to clear the frontier region. In the centre and along the coast were two groups, Coast Force (comprised mostly of the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade and 19 tanks from the 4th Royal Tank Regiment) and Escarpment Force (comprised mostly of the 4th Armoured Brigade and 22nd Guards Brigade). The former was responsible for capturing Halfaya Pass. while the latter was to capture the remainder of the frontier, namely Fort Capuzzo, Musaid and Sollum. The 7th Armoured Brigade Group, backed by artillery provided by its Support Group, was tasked with engaging and destroying Rommel's panzers, which were thought to be located at Hafid Ridge; in doing so, they would also have encircled any Axis units on the frontier between themselves and the remainder of the British forces.

After capturing the frontier, the brigades of the 7th Armoured Division would reform and continue on north to relieve Tobruk. Once joined by the Tobruk garrison, the combined forces would then press the offensive westwards, driving the Germans as far back as they could be pushed.

Leading the overall ground operation was Lieutenant General Noel Beresford-Peirse, commander of the British XIII Corps (Western Desert Force). General Frank Messervy commanded the Coast Force and Escarpment Force while General Michael O'Moore Creagh would command the 7th Armoured Brigade Group and the Support Group.

The ground forces would be accompanied by fourteen squadrons from the Royal Air Force (six fighter, eight bomber). Since the siege on Tobruk began, the RAF had interfered with Axis operations as much as possible by bombing the harbour of Benghazi (Rommel's most forward supply port) on nightly basis with Wellington medium bombers as well as attacking Axis airfields. During the day, Blenheim light bombers would be used to engage any enemy convoys. For Operation Battleaxe, they were to continue to operate at normal until three days before the operation was to begin. When Battleaxe did begin, the Wellingtons were to step up their attacks on shipping at Benghazi while all other aircraft capable of ground attacks were to focus on attacking enemy movement on the frontier. Once the battle began, fighter aircraft were then to defensively patrol over Allied ground forces while medium bombers were to stand ready for assisting the Army in engaging enemy columns. Such was the priority on Battleaxe, that Arthur Tedder – Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, Middle East – was instructed by the Chiefs of Staff to accept significant risks in other theatres by diverting all possible air support for it.

Both Beresford-Peirse and Tedder would be headquartered well in the rear of the attack, at Sidi Barrani and Maaten Baggush respectively. Beresford-Peirse chose Sidi Barrani as, even though is was more then a five hour drive from the battlefield, it was not only equipped with the most advanced airfield for reconnaissance planes available, it was also the most forward position he could take while maintaining communications with the even more distant Maaten Baggush.

This plan was based on Wavell's intelligence information (which was poor due to shortages of proper equipment and trained pilots needed for photographic reconnaissance), which incorrectly indicated that 2/3 of the German's tank strength was situated around Tobruk; this would have placed him at a decisive material advantage on the frontier region.

Wavell's concerns

Wavell himself was not fully confident about this plan though, as on the same day he gave orders for it, he sent the following dispatch to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff John Dill:

All available strength, which will be deciding factor, is being put into "Battleaxe". Various difficulties are delaying reconstitution 7th Armoured Division. Earliest date for beginning of forward move from Matruh will be June 7, and may be later. I think it right to inform you that the measure of success which will attend this operation is in my opinion doubtful. I hope that it will succeed in driving the enemy west of Tobruk and re-establishing land communications with Tobruk. If possible we will exploit success further. But recent operations have disclosed some disquietening features. Our armoured cars are too lightly-armoured to resist the fire of enemy fighter aircraft, and, having no gun, are powerless against the German eight-wheeled armoured cars, which have guns and are faster. This makes reconnaissance difficult. Our infantry tanks are really too slow for a battle in the desert, and have been suffering considerable casualties from the fire of the powerful enemy anti-tank guns. Our cruisers have little advantage in power or speed over German medium tanks. Technical breakdowns are still too numerous. We shall not be able to accept battle with perfect confidence in spite of numerical inferiority, as we could against the Italians. Above factors may limit our success. They also make it imperative that adequate flow of armoured reinforcements and reserves should be maintained.

To make matters worse, neither of Wavell's two divisions involved were at full strength as each had only two brigades instead of three. For the 4th Indian Infantry Division, commanded by Frank Messervy, it only had one of its regular brigades, the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade, while its other two, the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade and the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade, were respectively in Syria and East Africa; this was somewhat alleviated by the attachment of the 22nd Guards Brigade.

The attack was scheduled originally to start on June 7, but this date was pushed back at the instance of General Michael O'Moore Creagh, commander of the 7th Armoured Division whose squadrons hadn't received their tanks until June 9th; the new date was June 15, giving him just five days for additional training for his crews.

German preparation

German tanks advance in the desert shortly before the Battle of Sollum

Though Brevity had failed to yield any territory to the British, it showed Rommel that his front line defences were quite easily capable of being breached. Anticipating further British assaults from Egypt, Rommel used the lessons he had learned from his ineffective attacks on Tobruk and proceeded to create a line of fortified positions from Halfaya to Sidi Azeiz, placing a number of anti-tank guns and anti-tank mines on the Halfaya Pass, Point 206 (south of Forth Capuzzo) and on Point 208 (west of Fort Capuzzo on the Hafid Ridge). The primary responsibility of the frontier defence was charged to the 15th Panzer Division, which had recently received a new commander, General Walter Neumann-Silkow, on June 8th.

A considerable boost for Rommel's preparation came from weaknesses in the 7th Armoured Division's signals security, giving Rommel nine hours advanced knowledge of the operation, including dispositions, concerns and intentions. With this information, he placed the 5th Light Division to the south of Tobruk, ready to use it against either the Sollum area or on Tobruk itself depending on the situation; Rommel also ordered a large artillery bombardment of Tobruk the night before the operation was to begin in order to prevent the Tobruk garrison from breaking out.

Rommel's primary concern was now more of a logistical nature:

Unfortunately, our petrol stocks were badly depleted, and it was with some anxiety that we contemplated the coming British attack, for we knew that our moves would be decided more by the petrol gauge then by tactical requirements.

The battle

Day 1: June 15th

The RAF establishes air superiority

For the RAF, everything went according to plan on the first day. Enemy supply columns and airfields had been hit repeatedly up to the start of the attack, and once it began on the 15th British columns were able to move unmolested from their starting points at Sofafi and Buq-Buq to their destinations due to Allied fighters. Enemy aircraft were limited to only six attacks throughout the entire day.

The failed attack on Halfaya Pass

On the eastern side, at 05:15, Coast Force, commanded by Brigadier Reginald Savory and charged with capturing Halfaya Pass, started to move on to their objective.

On the top of the escarpment was the Halfaya Group, comprised of the 2nd Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders regiment, the thirteen tanks (twelve Matildas and one light tank) of the 4th Royal Tank Regiments C Squadron (which had previously captured Halfaya Pass during Operation Brevity), and an artillery battery from the 31st Field Regiment. To their east and below the lip of the escarpment were the 1st/6th Rajputana Rifles and 2nd/5th Mahratta Light Infantry regiments, two troops of the 4th Royal Tank Regiments A Squadron, and a few 25-pounder guns.

At 05:40, British artillery for the Halfaya Group was scheduled to open fire on the German and Italian forces stationed in Halfaya to provide cover for the tanks and infantry, but the battery had become bogged down by soft sand. After waiting until 06:00, fifteen minutes after the fighting began to the west below the escarpment, the commander of C Squadron, Major C.G. Miles, ordered his tanks to attack at the top of the pass; soon after though the anti-tank guns of the German and Italian defenders opened fire and within a few hours all but one light tank and one of the Matildas had been destroyed, including Miles'. The Camerons initially continued their advance but were soon driven back by a detachment of German armoured cars and motorised infantry.

The British forces below the escarpment did not fare much better, as four of the Matildas were disabled by anti-tank mines which were supposed to have been cleared; this blocked the path of the remaining two and reduced the small tank force to acting in a pillbox capacity.. The Rajputs and Mahrattas made several attempts to reach the pass, but were repelled each time; the Rajputs losing their commanding officer, Colonel P.R.H. Skrine, in the final attack.

Fort Capuzzo captured

At the central thrust, the 7th Royal Tank Regiment had reached Fort Capuzzo by noon and scattered the defenders who retreated north to join the 15th Panzer Division which lay between them and Bardia. Soon after though, they faced several counterattacks by a battalion from the 8th Panzer Regiment of the 15th Panzer Division. After being joined by the 22nd Guards Brigade, they faced the final and largest counterattack at 18:30, but managed to repulse it. These were, in actuality, not serious assaults, as Rommel would not commit the 15th Panzer Division to battle without having additional information on the situation. Instead, the 8th Panzer Regiment's primary tactic was to skirmish briefly and then feign a disordered rout in order to lure Matilda tanks into a chase which led them directly into concealed anti-tank guns. Neither side took much damage from these actions. In response to the British capture of Capuzzo, and concerned with a possible attack on Salum and Bardia, Rommel ordered the 5th Light Division to Sidi Azeiz in preparation for a possible counter-attack.

Success was also eventually had by the British at Point 206, where Squadron A of the 4th Royal Tank Regiment captured the area from the defenders, but lost it soon after in a counterattack. In the evening though, sixteen Matilda tanks of Squadron B joined in on the attack and the position was retaken at the total cost of eight Matildas.

In capturing these objectives, the British also took over 500 German and Italian prisoners. That night the 2nd Scots Guards, a battalion of the 22nd Guards Brigade, were able to advance further eastwards and additionally capture an outpost at Musaid.

Assault on Hafid Ridge repulsed

On the western side, the 7th Armoured Brigade had placed the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, equipped with older cruiser tanks, in front of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment so that the new Crusader tanks of the latter could be use as a surprise weapon.

The force reached Hafid Ridge (which actually consisted of three separate ridges) by about 09:00. After 2nd Royal Tank Regiment had crossed over the first ridge though, they were attacked at near point-blank range by dug in anti-tank guns, destroying two A9 cruiser tanks before the rest could retreat. This development posed a serious problem for the brigade, as the cruiser tanks were armed with 2-pounder anti-tank guns which lacked the High Explosive (HE) rounds needed to effectively engage infantry and artillery. Supporting artillery was not immediately accessible either, as it was attached to the Support Group in the south-west which was covering the 7th Armoured Brigades flank.

Since a frontal attack was unfeasible, it was decided to attempt a flanking attack while waiting for the artillery to arrive. A small force of tanks from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment was sent to the western part of the Hafid Ridge with orders to turn into the first valley. The attack went well at first, as the tanks caught the Axis forces unaware and were able to strafe along with their trenches with their machine guns, losing only one tank in the process. As they approached point 208 on their way eastward though, the commander became aware of its fortifications and ordered his units to disengage; due to an equipment shortage though, only one tank per troop was equipped with a radio and five of his tanks, not receiving the order, continued towards Point 208 and were destroyed by its emplaced 88 mm guns.

Soon, reports came in from the R.A.F. that German tanks were approaching and the order was given to clear the ridges in order to utilize its advantageous terrain for the upcoming tank battle. At 17:30 reports came in from the forward observers that the defences were withdrawing from Hafid Ridge. This seemed like the ideal time to strike, so the order was given for Squadron B of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment to attack. After clearing the first ridge, it looked as though the reports were accurate, as German trucks and towed guns were seen moving away over the second crest. Pursuit was given, but upon the British forces clearing the second ridge, the Axis forces sprung their trap and fired on the Crusader tanks at near point-blank range with waiting guns; within minutes, eleven of the Crusaders were destroyed and six more heavily damaged. The Axis infantry and anti-tank guns, berefit of entrenchments, also took significant casualties.

It was at this time that over thirty German tanks from a battalion of the 5th Panzer Regiment, part of the 5th Light Division which had earlier been stationed north at Sidi Azeiz, were seen arriving from the west. As it was starting to grow dark, neither side closed with the other and the 7th Armoured Brigade slowly withdrew during long range fighting.

Outcome of day 1 and plans for day 2

By the end of the first day Fort Capuzzo was held by the British while Halfaya Pass and Hafid Ridge both remained in Axis possession.

During the attacks, the British had lost a significant number of tanks. Within the 7th Armoured Brigade, the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment was down to twenty-eight cruiser tanks and the 6th Royal Tank Regiment only had twenty of their original fifty Crusaders; it should be noted that many of the tanks which had been disabled, but still repairable, were abandoned in the field as the 7th Armoured Brigade withdrew from Hafid Ridge, leaving them for seizure by German tank recovery teams. The 4th Armoured Brigade, from its original strength of roughly one hundred Matilda's, was down to thirty seven still operable (though eleven more would be repaired by the following morning). German panzer losses were mostly insignificant, though there had been fairly significant casualties among the garrisoning forces at Hafid Ridge, Point 206 and Fort Capuzzo.

Beresford-Peirse's plan for the next day was to have the 11th Infantry Brigade continue it's attack on Halfaya Pass, the 22nd Guards Brigade to hold their position, and for the 4th Armoured Brigade to reinforce the 7th Armoured Brigade so that the two combined could engage an outnumbered German 5th Light Division.

Due to Rommel's intelligence interception service, he had a fairly clear picture of the British situation, including their losses, problems and the new orders issued by Beresford-Peirse. Rommel's primary concern was for his forces situated at Halfaya Pass, they were now trapped by the 22nd Guards Brigade on one side and the 11th Infantry Brigade on the other and running low on supplies. His plan therefore was to have the 5th Light Division, which by midnight had almost fully reached Sidi Azeiz, drive south towards Sidi Omar and then east towards Sidi Suleiman, and finally north-east to Halfaya Pass, approaching the 11th Infantry Brigade from the rear. In order to prevent the reallocation of Matildas, either to reinforce the 7th Armoured Brigade as Beresford-Peirse planned or to assist the British forces at Halfaya, Neumann-Silkow, was ordered to undertake a committed attack against Capuzzo. He ordered the attacks to begin while still dark, as the British intended to start their operations shortly after dawn.

Day 2: June 16th

No progress made at Halfaya Pass

The 11th Infantry Brigade renewed their attack on Halfaya Pass, but met with same failure as the day prior. Bach's forces, though outnumbered and running low on supplies, were now totally surrounded, and thus could not retreat even if they were inclined to do so. Masservy, seeing this lack of progress, disregarded Beresford-Peirse's orders to release his tanks and decided to retain the few remaining Matildas he had until some breach of the Axis defences could be made.

German counter-attack repelled at Capuzzo

Neumann-Silkow began his attack on British held Fort Capuzzo at 06:00. He organized the eighty tanks under his command into two columns and attacked Capuzzo from either side. The attack went poorly from the onset, as the 15th Panzer Division ran directly into heavy artillery from 25-pounders which had been brought up during the night and Matlida tanks in entrenched positions. By 10:00, the 15th Panzer Division had lost fifty of its tanks, and by 12:00, they were forced to withdraw. Soon after the German forces withdrew the Scots Guards advanced further west, capturing the Sollum barracks to prevent Axis forces from either flanking on the east or linking up with the Halfaya garrison.

Running battle on the western flank

Starting at dawn, the 5th Light Division began to advance southwards past the western edge of Hafid Ridge. The 7th Armoured Brigade kept pace with them to the east, joined by the 7th Support Group as the two forces approached Sidi Omar.

During the running skirmish, the British tanks had a few successful attacks against unarmoured German transport vehicles, but they found themselves a significant disadvantage at anytime they engaged the panzers, who utilized an extremely effect tactic against them. The Panzer IV's, armed with high-explosive 75 mm guns with an effective range of ~2750 m, would open fire while still well out of the ~460 m range of the 2-pounder guns found on British tanks. While this would do minimal damage to the British tanks, it decimated their towed 25-pounder artillery, which would be forced to withdraw. Without artillery support, the Panzer IV and 50 mm gun armed Panzer III's could then safely somewhat close the gap with their British counterparts and pick off the thinly armed cruiser tanks while remaining out of range themselves. If the British tanks attempted to move forward to engage the panzers, the latter would quickly retreat behind a pre-established screen of anti-tank guns and lighter armoured elements would begin to move around the British flanks. To make matters worse for the 7th Armoured Brigade, they had problems with the reliability of their tanks and suffered numerous breakdowns.

By evening, both regiments of the 7th Armoured Brigade had retreated east of the Frontier Wire and the 7th Support Group and withdrawn even further. At 19:00, just as dusk began, the 5th Light Division further weakened the 7th Armoured Brigade with a strong attack which only ended due to the onset of the nights complete darkness.

Outcome of day 2 and plans for day 3

Rommel, who had personally witnessed several of the engagements between the 7th Armoured Brigade and 5th Light Division, decided to attempt a full thrust against the 7th Armoured Brigade. At 16:00 he ordered the 15th Panzer Division to leave only minimal elements at its position north of Fort Capuzzo and make all haste to the northern flank of the 5th Light Division which was pressing eastward to Sidi Suleiman. He hoped to completely cut off the majority of the British forces, encircling and then eliminating them.

During the afternoon, Wavell had flown to Beresford-Peirse's headquarters in order to be better able to make any major decisions. When he arrived though, Beresford-Peirse was away, meeting with Messervy and Creagh where he reconfirmed his orders for the infantry to maintain its attack on Halfaya and hold Capuzzo while the 4th Armoured Brigade was to join the 7th Armoured Brigade to confront the panzers of the 5th Light Division to the west. That night, on learning of the 5th Light Division's advances, General Messervy took the initiative into his own hands and ordered his forces to withdraw; to facilitate this, he ordered the remaining Matildas of the 4th Armoured Brigade to form a defensive screen to protect the retreating infantry from the advances of the panzers to the west.

In terms of forces, the 7th Armoured Brigade had lost more than half of the cruiser tanks that they had when the day started, now down to twenty-one in fit condition. The 4th Armoured Brigade was not faring any better, being reduced to seventeen Matildas.

Day 3: June 17th - The British narrowly escape encirclement

At 04:30, Rommel's panzers began their advance. The 5th Light Division encountered the 7th Armoured Brigade at 06:00 and began pushing them back. By 08:00 that morning, they had reached Sidi Suleiman.. At Capuzzo, the early morning movements of the 15th Panzer Division led Messervy to believe another attack was eminent, and he thus cancelled Beresford-Peirse's orders for the 4th Armoured Brigade to reinforce the 7th so that they could be retained.. The combination of the two events caused serious alarm to Creagh, who then sent a message to Beresford-Peirse, requesting his presence for instruction; Wavell, who was with Beresford-Peirse, took command of the operation and boarded a plane to Creagh's command post at Halfway House. This message was also intercepted by the Germans, as Rommel later wrote:

It sounded suspiciously as though the British commander no longer felt himself capable of handling the situation. It being now obvious that in their present bewildered state the British would not start anything for the time being, I decided to pull the net tight by going on to Halfaya.

By this time both the 5th Light Division and the 15th Panzer Division, striking from the south-west and north-west respectively, were only nine miles away from Halfaya.

At 10:00, as the Panzer divisions pushed eastward, they ran into the remaining Matildas of the 4th Armoured Brigade, joined on the flank by the remaining cruisers and artillery of the 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Support Group. The armour had now formed a screen to protect the 22nd Guards Brigade and 11th Indian Infantry Division as they retreated towards Halfway House.

At 10:45 Messervy contacted Creagh over the radio and, speaking Hindustani for security, informed him that he had ordered a retreat of his infantry from Capuzzo and Halfaya, to begin at 11:00. At noon, an hour later, Wavell and Beresford-Peirse arrived at Halfway House and learned of the retreat Messervy ordered, to which Wavell then gave his approval.

The armoured clash ringed throughout the afternoon as the British armour stalled the panzer advance to Halfaya until 16:00, by which time the 22nd Guards had safely escaped.

Aftermath

Casualties

Human casualties for both forces were both relatively light and fairly even. The Allies had 969 casualties, with 122 killed, 588 wounded, and 259 missing. The Germans had 678 casualties, with 93 killed, 350 wounded and 235 missing; while their Italian allies suffered 592 casualties in total.

During the course of the battle, tank losses were considerably skewed against the British, who lost 91 tanks (27 cruisers and 64 Matildas) either through enemy actions or by mechanical breakdown while the Axis had roughly 50 disabled, not including tanks which had been knocked out and repaired during the battle itself. This was not reflective of the final outcome though, as since the Axis controlled the battlefield, they were able to recovery all disabled vehicles, Allied and Axis alike, for salvage and repair; in the end, they only lost 12 tanks.

In terms of aircraft, the British suffered considerably higher losses then the German and Italian forces. They lost 33 fighters and 3 bombers in comparison to the destruction of 10 German aircraft. The primary reasons for such a high loss of RAF fighters, as stated by Air Marshal Tedder, was lack of sufficient pilot training and the need for continuous air cover; in order to keep fighters up at all times, it meant that each individual patrol had to be relatively weak.

Political consequences

Winston Churchill was displeased with the results of Operation Battleaxe. He had been expecting nothing less then complete success in the operation, and had instead received news that, not only had the operation failed, but that a great deal of the tanks that he had specially sent for it had been lost.

Churchill thus wanted Wavell out of the picture, but he could not have it look as though Wavell were being punished, far too many would defend the Commander-in-Chief and the blame could come back to London; he also couldn't have Wavell return to England, as embarrassing questions could be raised. Churchill instead seemed to have found an elegant solution by simply having Wavell exchange duties with the man he wanted to take charge in the Western Desert, General Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, India.

Beresford-Peirse was criticized for both his plan and control of the operation and on October 4th was sent to Sudan to take the place of William Platt, who had been promoted to Commander-in-Chief of the newly created East African Command; Beresford-Peirse was in turn replaced as commander of XIII Corps by Lieutenant-General Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen, who had been in charge of troops in Palestine.

References

• Brown, David (editor) (2001). The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: November 1940-December 1941: Vol 2. Whitehall Histories. Frank Cass Publishers. pp. 392 pages. ISBN 978-0714652054. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help); |format= requires |url= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Buell, Thomas B. (2002). The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. West Point Military History Series. Square One Publishers. pp. 448 pages. ISBN 978-0757001604. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Churchill, Winston S. (1950). The Second World War, Vol 3 The Grand Alliance. London: Cassell. ASIN B000H0I474. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
• Delany, John (1998). Fighting the Desert Fox: Rommel's Campaigns in North Africa April 1941 to August 1942. Arms & Armour. pp. 155 pages. ISBN 978-1854094070. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Editors (1990). Afrikakorps (Third Reich). Time-Life Education. pp. 192 pages. ISBN 978-0809469833. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); |last= has generic name (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Ferris, John (2005). Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays. Studies in Intelligence. Taylor & Francis Ltd. pp. 395 pages. ISBN 978-0415361958. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |2= (help); Text "edition+New edition" ignored (help)
• Gilbert, Martin (1989). The Second World War: A Complete History. H. Holt. pp. 846 pages. ISBN 978-0805005349. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
• Green, Jack (1994). Rommel's North Africa Campaign: September 1940 - November 1942. Combined Publishing. pp. 272 pages. ISBN 978-0938289340. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Heckstall-Smith, Anthony (1960). Tobruk - The Story of a Siege. Norton. ASIN: B000H7N38C. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
• Maule, Henry (1961). Spearhead general: The epic story of General Sir Frank Messervy and his men in Eritrea, North Africa and Burma. London: Odhams. pp. 384 pages. ASIN: B0000CL859. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
• Moorehead, Alan (2001). Desert War: The North African Campaign 1940-1943. London: Penguin. pp. 656 pages. ISBN 978-0140275148. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Orange, Vincent (2004). Tedder: Quietly in Command. London: Frank Cass Publishers. pp. 480 pages. ISBN 978-0714648170. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Pitt, Barrie (1989). Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941 (New Ed edition ed.). Paragon House. pp. 525 pages. ISBN 978-1557782328. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help); |format= requires |url= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Rommel, Erwin (1982) [1953]. The Rommel Papers (New edition ed.). Da Capo Press. pp. 545 pages. ISBN 978-0306801570. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help); |format= requires |url= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Windrow, Martin (1976). Rommel's Desert Army. Men-at-Arms Series. London: Osprey Publishing. pp. 48 pages. ISBN 978-0850450958. {{cite book}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Liddell Hart, Basil H. (1959). The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its Predecessors, Heavy Branch, Machine-Gun Corps, Tank Corps, and Royal Tank Corps, 1914-1945. London: Cassell. p. 553. ISBN 978-0892010790.

See also

• Operation Battleaxe order of battle

External links

• Achtung Panzer! - Johannes Kümmel - Der Löwe von Capuzzo / The Lion of Capuzzo
• AFV News - OPERATION "BATTLEAXE" The Second British Repost
• AFV News - THE DEADLY "88" Rommel's Answer to the "Matilda II"
• Italian Tanks at War - North Africa (February 12, 1941 - May 13, 1943)
• Panzer Abwer (blog) May 2005, June 2005, January 2006, February 2006, May 2006
• The Relief of Tobruk, Chapter 2: Lull in the Desert (Part of The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945)
• Lone Sentry - The Development of German Defensive Tactics in Cyrenaica—1941 (Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 5, October 16, 1942)