Canada–France relations
Modern Canada-France relations have been marked by high levels of military and economic cooperation, but also periods of diplomatic discord primarily over the status of Quebec.
History
At one time nearly all of Eastern Canada, from the Labrador shore and Fort Louisburg on the Atlantic coast to the Great Lakes and beyond, was under French dominion. While the gradual conquest of New France by the British, culminating in Wolfe's victory at the Plains of Abraham in 1759, deprived France of her American empire, the 'French of Canada' - Acadians, Quebecois, Métis, and others - remaind.
World Wars
A realignment of the great powers made allies of Canada (as part of the declining British Empire) and France just in time for the two World Wars that would rock the first half of the 20th century.
In the Second World War especially Canada was an important ally and staunch supporter of General Charles de Gaulle's 'Free French'. De Gaulle himself re-entered France following the Normandy invasion via the Canadian-won Juno Beach, and during a lavish 'state visit' to Ottawa in 1944 departed the assembled crowd with an impassioned call of "Vive le Canada! Vive le France!"
Tensions over the status of Quebec
In July 1967, while on an official state visit to Canada, President de Gaulle ignited a storm of controversy when he stood before a crowd of 100,000 in Montreal and uttered a call for the 'freedom' of Quebec: Vive le Québec Libre! Coming as it did on the centennial anniversary of Canada's founding, and amid the backdrop of Quebec's 'Quiet Revolution', such a provocative act on the part of a heretofore widely respected statesman and liberator of France would have a wide-ranging effect not only on Franco-Canadian relations but internal Canadian federal-provincial relations as well.
De Gaulle, a proponent of the ethnically defined nation-state, on several subsequent occasions proposed what he termed the "Austro-Hungarian solution" for Canada (based on the arrangement between Austria and Hungary), which appears similar to the "sovereignty association" model championed by René Lévesque.
While some historians have speculated that France under de Gaulle went so far as set up a spy network in Canada and even give aid to FLQ terrorists in the years leading up to 1967, France's diplomatic manoeuvrings are well documented, if little appreciated at the time. It so happened that just as Quebec, under the reformist Liberal government of Jean Lesage, was turning away from its isolationist past and attempting to find for itself a new place within the Canadian Confederation and within the wider francophone world, a willing and enthusiastic de Gaulle was there to give aid to Quebec's newfound nationalist ambitions.
Master Agreement
The first step towards Quebec developing an 'international personality' distinct from that of Canada, viewed by many as a stepping stone towards full independence, was for Quebec to develop relations with other 'nations' independent from those of Canada. This effort began in earnest following de Gaulle's return to power, during which period France and Quebec began exchanging ministers and government officials on a regular basis. Premier Lesage, for example, visited de Gaulle three times between 1961 and 1965.
Lesage's statement to the Quebec National Assembly that the French Canadian identity, culture, and language was endangered by a "cultural invasion from the U.S.A.," which threatened to make Canada a "cultural satellite of the United States" mirrored exactly the Gaullists concern for France's cultural survival in the face on an English onslaught. In this light France and Quebec set about in the early 1960's negotiating exchange agreements in the areas of education, culture, technical cooperation, and youth exchange. The Pearson government in Ottawa, which had just appointed a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and was taking other steps to ensure the place of French within Canada, would not stand for a province usurping a federal power (foreign affairs), and so signed a Master Agreement with France in 1965 that allowed for provinces to cooperate directly with France, but only in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction (such as education). It was not envisioned at the time by the federal government how much this agreement, and the doors it opened, would come to haunt them in the coming years.
The "Quebec Mafia"
The significant contingent of Quebec sovereignty supporters within the French government and the upper levels of the French foreign and civil services (primarily, but not exclusively, Gaullists), who came to be known as the "Quebec Mafia" within the Canadian foreign service and the press, took full advantage of the Master Agreement of 1965 to further their vision for Canada and Quebec. While there are too many instances to mention here, two stand out in their boldness:
Direct relations with Quebec
Shortly after de Gaulle's 1967 Montreal address the Consulate General in Quebec City, already viewed by many as a de facto embassy, was enlarged and the office of Consul General at Quebec replaced, by de Gaulle's order, with that of Consul General to the Quebec Government. At the same time, the flow of officials to Quebec City increased further, and it became accepted practice for high officials to visit Quebec without going to Ottawa at all - despite Ottawa's repeated complaints about the breaches of diplomatic protocol.
Many of these French officials, notably French 'Minister for Quebec' Jean de Lipkowski, would greatly anger and embarrass the Canadian government by vocally supporting Quebec independence while in Canada.
La Francophonie
The creation of la Francophonie, an international organization of wholly and partially French speaking countries modeled somewhat after the British Commonwealth, is another example of France conspiring with the newly elected Union Nationale Quebec government to undermine the Canadian federal government's authority over foreign affairs. While Canada agreed in principle to the organizations creation, it was dismayed by France's position that not only should Quebec participate as an equal, independent member, but that the federal government and (by omission) the other provinces with significant French minorities could not.
France's support was vital, but most Francophonie members would be newly independent African countries. While these countries depended on France for aid and assurances of their newfound independence, and were therefore very susceptible to French pressure, they could be swayed by the prospect of increased Canadian aid. Not only would increased aid be used to 'coerce' potential Francophonie members into backing Canada's position (over the France-Quebec position) on the organization membership, but it would also free them from dependence on France.
The first salvo in the Francophonie affair was launched in the winter of 1968 when Gabon, under pressure from France, invited Quebec - and not Canada or the other provinces - to attend a February francophone education conference in Libreville. Despite protests from the federal government the Quebec delegation attended and was treated to full state honours. In retaliation, Prime Minister Pearson took the extraordinary step of officially breaking off relations with Gabon. Pierre Trudeau, then Justice Minister, accused France of "using countries which have recently become independent for her own purposes" and threatened to break diplomatic relations with France.
The next such educational conference, held in 1969 in Zaire, would end in a relative win for the Canadian government. Zaire, which was a former colony of Belgium, was not as susceptible to French pressure as Gabon. At first it sent an invitation only to the federal government, which happily contacted the provinces concerned (Quebec, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba) about organizing a single delegation. Quebec, dismayed over the lack on an invitation, complained to the French, who then put pressure on Zaire, which then issued a second belated invitation to Quebec - offering as justification Quebec's attendance at the Gabon conference. Despite the last minute offer, Canada and the provinces had already reached an agreement whereby the provinces would attend as sub-delegations of the main Canadian delegation (although a French official absurdly stole the main 'Canada' sign from the delegation's table).
The final rounds in the effort to impose Canada's vision on la Francophonie would take place in the months leading up the organizations founding conference in Niger in 1969. It was this conference that would set the precedent that would be followed to this day, and so neither France and Quebec, nor Canada was prepared to go home the loser. For its part, France demanded that Quebec - and only Quebec - be issued in invitation. Niger - influenced in no small part by a promise of 4 yeas of "special" educational aid, a grant of 20 000 tons of wheat, and a geological survey of Niger offered by Canadian special envoy Paul Martin Sr. the month before - issued Canada the sole invitation and asked that the federal government to bring with it representatives of the interested provinces. The invitation, however, left open the prospect of Quebec being issued a separate invite if the federal government and the provinces could not come to an agreement.
Much to the consternation of the French and the indépendantistes within the Quebec government, Ottawa and the provinces reached an agreement similar to the arrangement employed in Zaire - with a federal representative leading a single delegation composed of delegates from the interested provinces. Under this arrangement la Francophonie would grow to become a major instrument of Canadian foreign aid on par with the Commonwealth, although clearly less important politically.
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Normalized relations
De Gaulle's resignation in 1969, and more importantly the election of the Liberals in Quebec under Robert Bourassa in 1970 gave impetus to the calls on both sides for normalization of France-Canada relations. While the ultra-Gaullists and the remaining members of the 'Quebec Mafia' continue to occasionally cause headaches for Canada - such a 1997 initiative by 'Mafia' members to have the French Post Office issue a stamp commemorating de Gaulle's 1967 visit to Montreal22 - never again would relations reach anything close to the hostility of the late 1960's.
The Gaullist policy of 'dualism' towards Canada, which called for distinct and separate relations between France and Canada and France and Quebec, has been replaced with a purposefully ambiguous policy of 'non-ingérance, mais non-indifférence'. Also, while visits by federal officials to Paris are now well received (Pierre Trudeau went to great lengths to avoid meeting with any French officials while on a ski vacation in France in 1970, stating bluntly "I would have liked to stay in Paris on my return trip to Canada but there are diplomatic difficulties"), visits by Quebec government officials are, while duly received, increasingly seen as tiresome and pointless.
Canada and France have even found common cause on some diplomatic fronts, such as efforts to insulate cultural industries within free trade regulations. Additionally, the maritime boundary between Canada and France's last North American territory, the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, was settled in a relatively amicable manner.
France's roll in NATO and the European Union is also of great concern to Canada.
France's deep-rooted anti-Americanism, most clearly on display during de Gaulle's tenure and finding its most worrisome manifestation in France's partial withdrawal from NATO in 1966, continues to cause trouble for Canada to this day. The French intransigence over a US 'pre-emptive assault' on Iraq has put the Canadian government in the difficult and unwelcome position of having to choose sides between traditional allies. Additionally, France's support for an integrated 'European Rapid Reaction Force' would likely come at the expense of the NATO alliance - a cornerstone of Canada's foreign policy for the past half century - which many in France see as a tool of "the Americans trying to artificially reassert their leadership in the Alliance after the Cold War at the expense of Europe's legitimate ambition to become a full fledged strategic actor."
France's economic and political clout within Europe is also increasingly important. While Canada-France trade have always been relatively modest (and absolutely miniscule when compared with Canada-US trade), the power France wields within the much larger European economy can have an impact on Canada's economic well-being. The future
While Canada and its priorities have survived several years of French diplomatic hostility to the country's very existence, there's no telling how the France-Canada relationship will evolve in the future. If nothing else the French language and their shared status as major western democracies will ensure that France and Canada have something in common.