Biological warfare

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Biological warfare, also known as germ warfare, is the use of any organism (bacteria, virus or other disease-causing organism) or toxin found in nature, as a weapon of war. It is meant to incapacitate or kill an adversary.

The creation and stockpiling of biological weapons is outlawed by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, signed by over 100 states, because a successful attack could conceivably result in thousands, possibly even millions, of deaths and could cause severe disruptions to societies and economies. Oddly enough, the convention prohibits only creation and storage, but not usage, of these weapons. However, the consensus among military analysts is that except in the context of bioterrorism, biological warfare is militarily of little use.

The main problem is that a biological warfare attack would take days to implement and therefore unlike a nuclear or chemical attack would not immediately stop an advancing army. As a strategic weapon, biological warfare is again militarily problematic, because unless it is used to poison enemy civillian towns, it is difficult to prevent the attack from spreading to either allies or to the attacker and a biological warfare attack invites immediate massive retaliation, usually in the same form.

you just got punk'd

Biological weapons characteristics

Ideal characteristics of biological weapons are high infectivity, high potency, availability of vaccines, and delivery as an aerosol.

Diseases most likely to be considered for use as biological weapons are contenders because of their lethality (if delivered efficiently), and robustness (making aerosol delivery feasible).

The biological agents used in biological weapons can often be manufactured quickly and easily. The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent but delivery in an infective form to a vulnerable target.

For example, anthrax is considered an excellent agent. We use it here because it is historically important and enough information is public that this discussion can't be a manual. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, pneumonic (lung) infections of anthrax usually do not cause secondary infections in other people. Thus, the effect of the agent is usually confined to the target. A pneumonic anthrax infection starts with ordinary "cold" symptoms and quickly becomes lethal, with a fatality rate that is 80% or higher. Finally, friendly personnel can be protected with suitable antibiotics or vaccines.

A mass attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1.5 to 5 micrometres. Too large and the aerosol would be filtered out by the respiratory system. Too small and the aerosol would be inhaled and exhaled. Also, at this size, nonconductive powders tend to clump and cling because of electrostatic charges. This hinders dispersion. So, the material must be treated with silica to insulate and discharge the charges. The aerosol must be delivered so that rain and sun does not rot it, and yet the human lung can be infected. There are other technological difficulties as well.

Diseases considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized include anthrax, ebola, pneumonic plague, cholera, tularemia, brucellosis, Q fever, Machupo, VEE, and smallpox. Naturally-occurring toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin, SEB, botulism toxin, and many mycotoxins.

Attacking crops

Instead of targeting humans, biological weapons could be designed to target food crops. Distributing a (possibly genetically enhanced) pathogen to ruin a country's harvest could have dire consequences for the country's ability to sustain itself. Biological agents used to target plants are called Bioherbicides, or Mycoherbicides if the agent is a fungus.

Protective measures

The primary civil defense against biological weaponry is to wash one's hands whenever one moves to a different building or set of people, and avoid touching door knobs, walls, the ground and one's mouth and nose. Washing literally sends the germs down the drain.

More exotic methods include decontamination, usually done with household chlorine bleach (5% solution of sodium hypochlorite). One useful decontamination is to leave shoes in an entranceway and make people wade and handwash in a footbath of bleach. Another useful technique is to periodically decontaminate floors and door knobs.

Medical methods of civil defense include stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines, and training for quick, accurate diagnoses and treatment. Many weaponized diseases are unfamiliar to general practitioners.

Positive pressure shelters are possible but not cost-effective except for the most important installations. This is because in most attacks, the agent will disperse in a long narrow ellipse downwind from the release point. Persons outside the ellipse will not be affected except by secondary infection. Persons within the release ellipse cannot be helped by civil defense measures. They need medical diagnosis and treatment.

Examples of biological warfare

1984 Rajneeshee Salmonella Attack

In the small town of The Dalles, Oregon, followers of the Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh (the Rajneeshee Cult) attempted to control a local election by infecting salad bars with Salmonella. The attack caused about 900 people to get sick. It is considered the first ever bioterrorism case in US history.

2001 anthrax attack

In September and October of 2001, several cases of anthrax broke out in the United States in the 2001 anthrax attacks, caused deliberately. This was a well-publicized act of bioterrorism. It motivated efforts to define biodefense and biosecurity, where more limited definitions of biosafety had focused on unintentional or accidental impacts of agricultural and medical technologies.

References

  • Orent, Wendy. "Plague, The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease.", Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, NY, 2004, ISBN 0-7432-3685-8.

Template:FnbEitzen, Edward M., Jr., M.D., M.P.H., FACEP, FAAP; and Takafuji, Ernest T., M.D., M.P.H. (1997). Historical Overview of Biological Warfare in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Brigadier General Russ Zajtchuk, MC, U.S. Army, Editor in Chief. Washington, DC:Office of The Surgeon General. ISBN unstated.

See also


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