1973 Chilean coup d'état
The Chilean coup d'état was a watershed event in the history of Chile and the Cold War. Historians and partisans alike have wrangled over its implications ever since.
In Chile's 1970 presidential election, in accordance with the constitution, Congress resolved the 3-way split — between Salvador Allende (with 36.3% of the vote), conservative (and former president) Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (35.8%), and the Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic (27.9%) — by voting to approve Allende's narrow plurality. Allende's Socialist political agenda brought opposition from sectors of Chilean society as well as the United States, which placed diplomatic and economic pressure on the government.
On September 11, 1973, less than three months after the first failed coup attempt, and less than a month after an August 22, 1973 Chamber of Deputies of Chile Resolution [1] condemned Allende's alleged breaches of the constitution and implored his forcible removal, the Chilean military overthrew Allende, who died during the coup. Augusto Pinochet exploited the situation to seize total power and establish an anti-communist junta which lasted until Pinochet stepped down voluntarily in 1990.
Situation before the coup
When Allende came to power in 1970, Chilean society was already wracked by huge economic difficulties. Problems such as slow growth, inflation, unequal income distribution and the concentration of economic power remained stubborn and intractable. The majority of the Chilean population were at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum and had grown weary of perennial problems that were affecting the country.[citation needed]
Allende becomes president
There are generally two views of the voting in 1970. Those who opposed Salvador Allende point out that he received less than 1% more of the vote than his closest opponent (36.3% to 35.8%) and did not have a majority. Also his vote was actually a 2.9% decline from his 1964 percentage. Those who supported him point instead to the fact that leftist forces clearly won a majority: in addition to Allende, running with the Unidad Popular (UP or Popular Unity) coalition, Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic won 27.9% with a similar platform to Allende's. (Allende & Tomic together therefore received 64.2%) Conservative former president Jorge Alessandri received slightly under 35.8% of the vote.
| Candidate | Votes | % |
|---|---|---|
| Allende | 1,066,372 | 36.29% |
| Alessandri | 1,050,863 | 35.76% |
| Tomic | 821,350 | 27.95% |
| Total | 2,943,561 | Source: PDBA |
According to the constitution, Congress had to decide between the two candidates who had received the most votes. The precedent set on the three previous occasions this situation had arisen since 1932 was for Congress simply to choose the candidate with the largest number of votes; indeed, former president Alessandri had been elected in 1958 with 31.6% of the popular vote.
In this case, however, there was an active campaign against Allende's confirmation by Congress, and his presidency was ratified only after he signed a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees".
It has been argued that given that less than the majority of the voters voted for him, Allende did not have a clear "mandate" to embark in the wide reforms put forward on his program. But the legality of the election itself is not in dispute.
The Allende years
In office, Allende pursued a policy he called La vía chilena al socialismo ("The Chilean Way to Socialism"). This included nationalization of certain large-scale industries (notably copper), reform of the health care system, a continuation of his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva's reforms of the educational system, a program of free milk for children, and an attempt at agrarian reform. [2] The previous government of Eduardo Frei has already partly nationalised copper by acquiring a 51 percent share in foreign owned mines. Allende expropriated the remaining percentage without compensating the U.S. companies that owned the mines.
Chilean presidents were allowed a maximum of six years, which may explain Allende's haste to restructure the economy. Not only did he have a significant restructuring program organised, it had to be a success if a successor to Allende was going to be elected.
The government's efforts to pursue these reforms led to strong opposition by landowners, some middle-class sectors, the rightist National Party, and eventually the Christian Democrats. Also, the Roman Catholic Church was displeased with the direction of his educational reforms [3].
The land reforms that Allende highlighted as one of the central policies of his government had already begun under his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva, who had expropriated between one-fifth and one-quarter of all properties liable to takeover [Collier & Sater, 1996]. The Allende government's intention was to seize all holdings of more than eighty basic irrigated hectares [Faundez, 1988]. Allende also intended to improve the socio-economic welfare of Chile's poorest citizens. A key element was to provide employment, either in the new nationalised enterprises or on public works projects.
In the first year of Allende's term, the short-term economic results of Minister of the Economy Pedro Vuskovic's expansive monetary policy were unambiguously favorable: 12% industrial growth and an 8.6% increase in GDP, accompanied by major declines in inflation (down from 34.9% to 22.1%) and unemployment (down to 3.8%). However, these results were not sustained and in 1972 the Chilean escudo had runaway inflation of 140%. The combination of inflation and government-mandated price-fixing led to the rise of black markets in rice, beans, sugar, and flour, and a "disappearance" of such basic commodities from supermarket shelves. [4]
Towards the end of 1971, Cuban dictator Fidel Castro toured Chile extensively during a four-week visit. [5] This gave credence to the belief of those on the right that "The Chilean Way to Socialism" was an effort to put Chile on the same path as Cuba.
October 1972 saw the first of what were to be a wave of confrontational strikes by some of the historically well-off sectors of Chilean society. A strike by owners of trucks was joined by small businesmen, some (mostly professional) unions, and some student groups. Other than the inevitable damage to the economy, the chief effect of the 24-day strike was to bring the head of the army, general Carlos Prats, into the government as Interior Minister. [6]
In addition to the earlier-discussed provision of employment, Allende also raised wages on a number of occasions throughout 1970 and 1971. These rises in wages were negated by continuing increases in prices for food. Although price rises had also been high under Frei (27% a year between 1967 and 1970), a basic basket of consumer goods rose by 120% from 190 to 421 escudos in one month alone, August 1972. In the period 1970-72, while Allende was in government, exports fell 24% and imports rose 26%, with imports of food rising an estimated 149% [figures are from Nove, 1986, pp4-12, tables 1.1 & 1.7]. Although nominal wages were rising, there was not a commensurate increase in the standard of living for the Chilean population.
The falls in exports were mostly due to a fall in the price of copper. Chile was at the mercy of international fluctuations in the value of its single most important export. As with almost half of developing countries, more than 50 per cent of Chile's export receipts were from a single primary commodity [Hoogvelt, 1997]. Adverse fluctuation in the international price of copper negatively affected the Chilean economy throughout 1971-2. The price of copper fell from a peak of $66 per ton in 1970 to only $48-9 in 1971 and 1972 [Nove, 1986]. This fall in the value of copper would combine with a lack of economic aid to bring about the economic conditions that led to events later in 1973.
Despite declining economic indicators, Allende's Popular Unity coalition actually slightly increased its vote to 43 percent in the parliamentary elections early in 1973. However, by this point what had started as an informal alliance with the Christian Democrats [7] was anything but: the Christian Democrats now leagued with the right-wing National Party to oppose Allende's government, the two parties calling themselves the Confederación Democrática (CODE). The conflict between the executive and legislature paralyzed initiatives from either side. [8]
On June 29, 1973, a tank regiment under the command of Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded the presidential palace (La Moneda) in a violent but unsuccessful coup attempt. [9] That failed coup was followed by a further strike at the end of July, joined this time by the copper miners of El Teniente as well. On August 9, General Prats was made Minister of Defense, but this decision proved so unpopular with the military that on August 22 he was forced to resign not only this position but his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army; he was replaced in the latter role by Augusto Pinochet. [10]
For some months, the government had been afraid to call upon the national police known as the carabineros, for fear of their lack of loyalty. In August 1973, a constitutional crisis was clearly in the offing: the Supreme Court publicly complained about the government's inability to enforce the law of the land and on August 22 the Chamber of Deputies (with the Christian Democrats now firmly uniting with the National Party) accused Allende's government of unconstitutional acts and called on the military ministers to assure the constitutional order. [11]
- On May 26, 1973, Chile’s Supreme Court issued a unanimous resolution denouncing the Allende regime’s "disruption of the legality of the nation" by its failure to uphold judicial decisions. [12]
The Chamber of Deputies Resolution
On August 22, 1973 the Christian Democrats and the National Party members of the Chamber of Deputies passed, by 81 to 47 votes, a resolution entitled "Declaration of the Breakdown of Chile’s Democracy", which called upon the military to "put an immediate end" to what they described as "breach[es of] the Constitution... with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the constitutional order of our Nation and the essential underpinnings of democratic coexistence among Chileans." [13]
The resolution declared that the Allende government was seeking "...to conquer absolute power with the obvious purpose of subjecting all citizens to the strictest political and economic control by the state... [with] the goal of establishing a totalitarian system," and claimed that it had made "violations of the Constitution" into "a permanent system of conduct." Many of the charges came down to disregarding the separation of powers and arrogating the prerogatives of both the legislature and judiciary within the executive.
Among other particulars, the regime was accused of:
- ruling by decree, thus thwarting the normal system of adopting legislation
- refusing to enforce judicial decisions against its own partisans and "not carrying out sentences and judicial resolutions that contravene its objectives"
- ignoring the decrees of the independent General Comptroller's Office
- various offenses related to the media, including usurping control of the National Television Network and "applying ... economic pressure against those media organizations that are not unconditional supporters of the government..."
- allowing its supporters to assemble even when armed, while preventing legal assembly by its opponents
- "...supporting more than 1,500 illegal 'takings' of farms..."
- illegal repression of the El Teniente strike
- illegally limiting emigration
The resolution finally condemned the "creation and development of government-protected armed groups which... are headed towards a confrontation with the Armed Forces." Allende's efforts to re-organize the military and police, which he could not trust in their current forms, were characterized as "notorious attempts to use the Armed and Police Forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks."
Although this call for "redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the constitutional order of our Nation and the essential underpinnings of democratic coexistence" was invoked to justify the September 11 coup, in retrospect that was clearly not the agenda of the coup.
Allende responds
Two days later (August 24, 1973), Allende responded [14], [15], characterizing Congress's declaration as "destined to damage the country's prestige abroad and create internal confusion," and predicting that "It will facilitate the seditious intention of certain sectors." He pointed out that the declaration (passed 81-47 in the Chamber of Deputies) had not obtained the two-thirds Senate majority constitutionally required to convict the president of abuse of power: essentially, they were "invoking the intervention of the Armed Forces and of Order against a democratically elected government" and "subordinat[ing] political representation of national sovereignty to the armed institutions, which neither can nor ought to assume either politicial functions or the representation of the popular will."
Allende argued that he had followed constitutional means in bringing members of the military into the cabinet "at the service of civic peace and national security, defending republican institutions against insurrection and terrorism." In contrast, he said that Congress was promoting a coup or a civil war, using a declaration "full of affirmations that had already been refuted beforehand" and which, in substance and process (handing it directly to the various ministers rather than delivering it to the president) violated a dozen articles of the then-current constitution. Further, he argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role.
"Chilean democracy," Allende wrote, "is a conquest by all of the people. It is neither the work nor the gift of the exploiting classes, and it will be defended by those who, with sacrifices accumulated over generations, have imposed it... With a tranquil conscience... I sustain that never before has Chile had a more democratic government than that over which I have the honor to preside... I solemnly reiterate my decision to develop democracy and a state of law to their ultimate consequences... Parliament has made itself a bastion against the transformations... and has done everything it can to perturb the functioning of the finances and of the institutions, sterilizing all creative initiatives."
Allende went on to argue that the parliamentarians used the expression Estado de derecho ("rule of law") to refer to "a situation which presupposes economic and social injustice... which our people have rejected." Strong economic and political means, he said, would be needed to get the country out of its current crisis, and Congress was obstructing these means; having already "paralyzed" the state, they were now seeking to "destroy" it.
Allende concluded by calling upon "the workers, all democrats and patriots" to join him in defense of the constitution and of the "revolutionary process."
Military coup of 1973
General Pinochet removed Allende in a military coup d'état on September 11, 1973, in which rebels bombed the Presidential Palace with British-made Hawker Hunter fighter jets. Allende and some of his aides were besieged in the palace. Allende refused to surrender, and addressed the nation for a last time in a potent farewell speech. During this coup, Allende died. The junta officially declared that he committed suicide with a machine gun (generally presumed to be the machine gun given to him by Fidel Castro), and an autopsy labelled his death as suicide. This explanation has been widely accepted, even by members of his own party and family, after decades of silence and pointing to the Military. This (now) general acceptance is based on statements given by two doctors from the La Moneda Palace infirmary: Patricio Guijón, who made a statement at the time, and José Quiroga who confirmed it many years later. (Some sources misattribute these statements to "Allende's personal doctor"; that would be Enrique Paris Roa, who does not appear to have made such a statement.) However some still insist he was murdered by Pinochet's military forces while defending the palace. [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [Gonzalez 1988]
Two days after removing Allende, Pinochet moved to solidify his control against any opposition. On September 13, in a bloodless coup, the junta dissolved the Congress. The National Stadium was used as a concentration camp holding 40,000 prisoners. Approximately 130,000 individuals were arrested in a three-year period, with the number of dead and "disappeared" reaching into the thousands within the first few months. Most of the people targeted had been supporters of Allende; the September 13 decree also outlawed the parties that had been part of Popular Unity, and all political activity was declared "in recess".
Initially there were four leaders of the junta: in addition to Pinochet from the Army, there were Gustavo Leigh Guzmán of the Air Force, José Toribio Merino Castro of the Navy, and César Mendoza Durán of the National Police (Carabineros de Chile). Coup leaders soon decided against a rotating presidency and named Pinochet permanent head of the junta.
In the book in which he recounts the coup (El Día decisivo), Pinochet affirms that he was the leading plotter of the coup and used his position as Commander of the Army to coordinate a far-reaching scheme that was coordinated with the other branches of the military. In recent years, however, high military officials from the time have said that Pinochet only reluctantly got involved in the coup a few days before it was scheduled to occur.
Once the Junta was in power, Pinochet soon consolidated his control, first retaining sole chairmanship of the Junta (originally agreed to be rotated among all members), and he was proclaimed the President of the Republic. In October 1973, at least 70 people were killed by the Caravan of Death (Caravana de la Muerte).
Alleged U.S. role in the 1973 coup
The U.S. government under Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger was hostile to Allende from the beginning of his election due to his Marxist and pro-Cuban views and his nationalization of partly owned U.S. property such as the copper mines.
After Allende's election in 1970, the CIA worked to convince the Chilean Congress of blocking Allende's inauguration. When that failed, the U.S. planned to have him deposed by a military coup. That option was later turned off by Kissinger who thought it would fail. Afterwords, the U.S. continued to place economic pressure on Chile while funding anti-Allende organizations and people.
After the 1973 coup, rumours spread that the CIA had been responsible for overthrowing Allende. However, the available evidence suggests that after 1970 the U.S. was concentrating on helping the opposition defeat Allende in the 1976 elections and Pinochet acted alone. Nevertheless, the belief that the U.S. overthrew Allende and possibly assassinated him still carries widespread acceptance today.
Debate
Over the years, both the perpetrators of the coup themselves and their supporters have justified the coup by arguing that it was essential for preserving democracy and prosperity in Chile. They claim that Salvador Allende wanted to establish a Cuban-style dictatorship, which in their view would have destroyed human rights as well as economic prosperity, and therefore they insist that the forcible removal of the elected president was a necessary and justified course of action. Although they acknowledge an initial decline in the economy, supporters contend that subsequent economic growth in the late 1980s and 1990s was a direct result of Pinochet's economic policy. Those opposed to the coup characterize the notion of preserving democracy by instituting a dictatorship as ridiculous and hypocritical. They further argue that Allende won the presidency in a free and fair election. As Chile had been a democracy since 1932, the coup represented an unprecedented and inexcusable outrage against democracy, critics have argued. Among the evidence against the coup being an attempt to safeguard democracy and prosperity in Chile are the several thousand documented cases of torture as well as "disappearances". Among the more famous cases are Charles Horman, a US citizen who was "disappeared", then tortured and killed during the coup itself and Chilean songwriter Víctor Jara, murdered while held prisoner in the Chile Stadium immediately after the coup. Critics also argue that the coup failed in any goal of preserving prosperity for any except a small elite. In the early Pinochet years, unemployment rose, real wages fell, the divide between rich and poor grew, decreasing the economic prosperity of the average Chilean. (See Chile under Pinochet)
A number of people and organisations who supported the coup when it took place were later very critical of Pinochet's regime. They considered the activities of Allende's regime illegal, in a way that justified a coup, but Pinochet did not restore democracy as they had hoped for. Thus, these people and organisations are supporting that a coup was carried out but not the rule carried out by the Pinochet government.
Quotes
- "[Military rule aimed] to make Chile not a nation of proletarians, but a nation of entrepreneurs." — Augusto Pinochet
- "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves." — Henry Kissinger
- "Make the economy scream [in Chile to] prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him" — Richard Nixon, orders to CIA director Richard Helms on September 15, 1970
- "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end, utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG and American hand be well hidden..." — A communique to the CIA base in Chile, issued on October 16, 1970
- "Not a nut or bolt shall reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and all Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty." — Edward M. Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, upon hearing of Allende's election.
- "We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [Garbled] created the conditions as great as possible. — Henry Kissinger conversing with President Nixon about the coup.
See also
- 1970 Chilean presidential election
- Augusto Pinochet - took power in 1973 coup
- Chile under Allende
- Chile under Pinochet
- History of Chile
- Salvador Allende - deposed by 1973 coup
- Project FUBELT - secret CIA operations documents: US government spent millions of dollars to unseat Allende.
- U.S. intervention in Chile
Media
- Chile - Toad the Wet Sprocket
- The Ballad of Victor Jara - Rod MacDonald
- Missing
External links
- La Tercera, newspaper September 11, 1973 (in Spanish)
- La Tercera, El Once, includes news of different newspaper of days previous to the coup (in Spanish)
- Detailed minute-by-minute account of the events of September 11, 1973 by historian Ascanio Cavallo (in Spanish)
- An extensive Spanish-language site providing a day-by-day chronology of the Allende era. This is clearly a partisan, pro-Allende source, but the research and detail are enormous.
- Resolution of August 22, 1973 "Declaration of the Breakdown of Chile’s Democracy." (Wikisource)
- Alternate source of the Resolution of August 22, 1973 (In English, German, Spanish, French, Polish)
- Allende's August 24, 1973 response to the Chamber of Deputies' declaration
- "Never Again: An essay about the breakdown of democracy in Chile" by José Piñera, a former Minister of Pinochet (examination of events leading up to, and implications regarding, the Resolution of August 22, 1973. (In English, Italian, Spanish) (Mirror site)
- National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project which provides documents obtained from FOIA requests regarding U.S. involvement in Chile, beginning with attempts to promote a coup in 1970 and continuing through U.S. support for Pinochet
References
- Simon Collier & William F. Sater (1996). A History of Chile: 1808-1994. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Julio Faundez (1988). Marxism and democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the fall of Allende, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ignacio González Camus, ed. (1988). El día en que murió Allende (The day that Allende Died), Chilean Institute of Humanistic Studies (ICHEH) / CESOC.
- Anke Hoogvelt (1997). Globalisation and the postcolonial world, London: Macmillan.
- Thomas Karamessines (1970). Operating guidance cable on coup plotting in Chile, Washington: National Security Council.
- Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979). "Dictatorships and Double Standards", Commentary, November, pp 34-45.
- Henry Kissinger (1970). National Security Decision 93: Policy Towards Chile, Washington: National Security Council.
- Richard Norton-Taylor (1999). "Truth will out: Unearthing the declassified documents in America which give the lie to Lady Thatcher's outburst", The Guardian, 8 July 1999, London: Guardian Newspapers Ltd.
- Alec Nove (1986). Socialism, Economics and Development, London: Allen & Unwin.
- James F. Petras & Morris H. Morley (1974). How Allende fell: A study in U.S.–Chilean relations, Nottingham: Spokesman Books.
- Sigmund, P.E. (1986). "Development Strategies in Chile, 1964-1983: The Lessons of Failure", Chapter 6 in I.J. Kim (Ed.), Development and Cultural Change: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, New York: Paragon House Publishers, pp. 159-178.
- Valenzuela, J.S., & Valenzuela, A. (1993). "Modernisation and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin-American Underdervelopment", in M.A. Seligson & J.T. Pass-Smith (Eds.), Development and Underdevelopment: The Political Economy of Inequality, Boulder: Lynnes Rienner, pp. 203-216.