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The first detachment to attack was Major Reno's, conducted after receiving orders from Custer issued by Lt. [[William W. Cooke]]. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or propensity to stand and fight, were to pursue the Indians and "bring them to battle". However, Custer did promise to "support...[Reno] with the whole outfit". Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today called Reno Creek and immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and ...not running away".
The first detachment to attack was Major Reno's, conducted after receiving orders from Custer issued by Lt. [[William W. Cooke]]. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or propensity to stand and fight, were to pursue the Indians and "bring them to battle". However, Custer did promise to "support...[Reno] with the whole outfit". Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today called Reno Creek and immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and ...not running away".


Sending a message to Custer, but hearing nothing in return, Reno advanced rapidly northward, stating that he drove the enemy "with ease". However, he suspected "a trap" and stopped a few hundred yards short of the encampment, dismounting and deploying in a [[skirmish line]], as standard army doctrine called for. In deploying in a skirmish line, every fifth trooper handled the horses for four troopers taking firing positions, thus immediately reducing the fighting force by 20%. The troopers on the skirmish line were positioned five to ten yards apart, with officers just to their rear and the troopers with horses behind the officers. After about 20 minutes of long distance firing he had taken only one casualty but the odds against him had become more obvious (Reno estimated five to one) and Custer had not reinforced him. Reno ordered a withdrawal into nearby woods in a loop of the river, then made a disorderly retreat across the river to reach the high ground of the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was confused and immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. Reno later reported that 3 officers and 29 troopers were killed during the retreat and the subsequent [[ford (river)|fording]] of the river and another officer and 13-18 men missing, left behind in the woods, although most of these men eventually rejoined the detachment.
Sending a message to Custer, but hearing nothing in return, Reno advanced rapidly northward, stating that he drove the enemy "with ease". However, he suspected "a trap" and stopped a few hundred yards short of the encampment, dismounting and deploying in a [[skirmish line]], as standard army doctrine called for. In deploying in a skirmish line, every fifth trooper handled the horses for four troopers taking firing positions, thus immediately reducing the fighting force by 20%. The troopers on the skirmish line were positioned five to ten yards apart, with officers just to their rear and the troopers with horses behind the officers. After about 20 minutes of long distance firing he had taken only one casualty but the odds against him had become more obvious (Reno estimated five to one) and Custer had not reinforced him. After a bullet splattered the brains of the Indian scout next to him across the side of his face, Reno hastily ordered a withdrawal into nearby woods in a loop of the river. As pressure from the counterattacking Indians mounted, he was then forced to make a disorderly retreat across the river to reach the high ground of the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was confused and immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. Reno later reported that 3 officers and 29 troopers had been killed during the retreat. In the subsequent [[ford (river)|fording]] of the river he lost another officer and 13-18 men, who were left behind in the woods. Most of these men eventually rejoined the detachment, however.


[[Image:little bighorn memorial overview with clouds.jpg|thumb|The battlefield today.]]
[[Image:little bighorn memorial overview with clouds.jpg|thumb|The battlefield today.]]
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Custer then rode north along the bluffs, and descended into a drainage called Medicine Tail Coulee, which led to the river. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the [[coulee]], going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. Other authorities believe that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered by the Indians who came from the Reno fight, it was too late to break back through to the south, where Reno and Benteen could have provided reinforcement.
Custer then rode north along the bluffs, and descended into a drainage called Medicine Tail Coulee, which led to the river. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the [[coulee]], going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. Other authorities believe that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered by the Indians who came from the Reno fight, it was too late to break back through to the south, where Reno and Benteen could have provided reinforcement.


Within less than 30 minutes,<ref>Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, pg 158</ref><ref>Graham, Benteen letter to Capt. R.E. Thompson, pg 211</ref><ref>Graham, Gall's Narrative pg 88</ref> Custer's force was completely annihilated. Only two men from the 7th Cavalry later claimed to have seen Custer engage the Indians&mdash;a young Crow whose name translated as [[Curley]], and a trooper named [[Peter Thompson (soldier)|Peter Thompson]], who had fallen behind Custer's column, and most 'white' accounts of the last moments of Custer's forces are conjecture. There were a number of eyewitness accounts collected from indians at the time, and many years later.<ref>Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985</ref><ref>For an analysis of Curley's account, see Graham, pp. 10-18. Fox, pp. 316-317 discusses Thompson.</ref> Lakota accounts assert that Crazy Horse personally led one of the large groups of Lakota who overwhelmed the cavalrymen.<ref>Graham, pp. 45-56.</ref> While exact numbers are difficult to determine, it is commonly estimated that the Northern Cheyenne and Lakota outnumbered the 7th Cavalry by approximately 3:1, a ratio which was extended to 5:1 during the fragmented parts of the battle. In addition, some of the Indians were armed with repeating [[Spencer repeating rifle|Spencer]] and [[Winchester rifles]], while the 7th Cavalry carried single-shot [[Springfield Model 1873|Springfield]] carbines, which had a slow rate of fire and tended to jam when overheated. The Springfield Model 1873 carbines were issued with a copper cartridge. Troopers soon discovered that the copper expanded in the breech when heated upon firing and jammed the rifle, by preventing extraction of the fired cartridge case, requiring manual extraction with a knife blade, rendering the carbines useless in combat except as a club. The opposing warriors carried a large variety of weapons, from bows and arrows to [[Henry rifle]]s. Custer was known to have owned a pair of [[Webley Revolver|Webley]] RIC ([[Royal Irish Constabulary]]) [[double action]] revolvers, chambered in .442 Webley, which he used at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, instead of the [[Colt Single Action Army]], issued to his troops.<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/burntumber60/MPdoerner.html John A. Doerner, Chief Historian, Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument]</ref>
Within less than 30 minutes,<ref>Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, pg 158</ref><ref>Graham, Benteen letter to Capt. R.E. Thompson, pg 211</ref><ref>Graham, Gall's Narrative pg 88</ref> Custer's force was completely annihilated. Only two men from the 7th Cavalry later claimed to have seen Custer engage the Indians&mdash;a young Crow whose name translated as [[Curley]], and a trooper named [[Peter Thompson (soldier)|Peter Thompson]], who had fallen behind Custer's column, and most 'white' accounts of the last moments of Custer's forces are conjecture. There were a number of eyewitness accounts collected from indians at the time, and many years later.<ref>Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985</ref><ref>For an analysis of Curley's account, see Graham, pp. 10-18. Fox, pp. 316-317 discusses Thompson.</ref> Lakota accounts assert that Crazy Horse personally led one of the large groups of Lakota who overwhelmed the cavalrymen.<ref>Graham, pp. 45-56.</ref> Although exact numbers are difficult to determine, Custer had with him about 208 officers and men, while the combined Indian warriors numbered as many as 1800. Thus, in absolute terms Custer's own unit was outnumbered 9-1, but the ratio during the fighting was probably somewhat smaller, since hundreds of Indians were distracted throughout the fight by Reno and Benteen's units to the rear.


White apologists for the disaster hold that the disaster occurred because some of the Indians were armed with repeating [[Spencer repeating rifle|Spencer]] and [[Winchester rifles]]. This claim is overblown, however, and many of the Indians did not even carry modern weapons. The 13-year-old Black Elk, in his first fight, was ordered by an older brave to finish off a wounded cavalry trooper and take his rifle. It was Black Elk's first carbine.<ref>Michno</ref> For its part, the 7th Cavalry was not armed with available repeaters (7-shot Spencer carbines had been available since 1863, higher-capacity Henry rifles for about as long, and the famous Winchester 73 was already 3 years old. Still, the federal army had almost always eschewed purchasing these superior weapons for their troops, even during the Civil War, though Lincoln, an excellent frontier rifleman himself, had signed an executive order by 1863 allowing those cavalry units that chose to purchase these weapons to do so.). Thus, instead of the best light weapons available, Custer's men carried the heavy, breach-loading, single-shot [[Springfield Model 1873|Springfield]] .45-70 caliber carbine. This weapon had a slow rate of fire and tended to jam when overheated. Worse, the Springfield Model 1873 carbines had been issued with copper cartridges. Troopers soon discovered that the copper expanded in the breech when heated upon firing and jammed the rifle, preventing extraction of the fired cartridge case. This situation required manual extraction with a knife blade, rendering the carbines useless in combat except as a club. Accordingly, Custer's men at the end turned to their more reliable revolvers. Custer himself was known to have owned a pair of [[Webley Revolver|Webley]] RIC ([[Royal Irish Constabulary]]) [[double action]] revolvers, chambered in .442 Webley, which he used at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, instead of the [[Colt Single Action Army]], issued to his troops.<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/burntumber60/MPdoerner.html John A. Doerner, Chief Historian, Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument]</ref>
The terrain of the battlefield gave Lakota and Cheyenne bows an advantage, since Custer's troops were pinned in a depression on higher ground from which they could not use [[direct fire]] at the Indians in [[defilade]]. On the other hand, the Lakota and Cheyenne were able to shoot their arrows into the depression by launching them on a high arching [[indirect fire]], with the volume of arrows ensuring severe casualties. U.S. [[small arms]] might have been more accurate over open distances, but the fighting on this occasion was [[close combat]] where rate of fire and reliability of a weapon were more important attributes.

Although the opposing warriors carried a large variety of weapons, from bows and arrows, war clubs (the traditional Plains Indian war club--the painted femur of a bison or elk) and lances to (some say) [[Henry rifle]]s, the Indian accounts, painted on buffalo hides after the battle, depict the fight as one of Indian bows and arrows against Army carbines and pistols. The bow gave the Cheyenne and Sioux warriors an advantage in the rough, brush-covered terrain, allowing them to lob arrows into the soldiers positions from below the ridge without exposing themselves. Indeed, the terrain of the battlefield gave Lakota and Cheyenne bows an advantage, since Custer's troops were pinned in a depression on higher ground from which they could not use [[direct fire]] at the Indians in [[defilade]]. U.S. [[small arms]] might have been more accurate over open distances, but the fighting on this occasion was [[close combat]] in heavy cover, where rate of fire and reliability of a weapon were more important attributes. After Crazy Horse led his fifty or so men across the middle of the strung-out defensive line, the Indian accounts agree that the battle deteriorated into a "buffalo run", in which the soldiers who could do so rode for Custer's position, and those without horses ran after them. At this point in the battle, the Indians were riding along the ridge en masse, whacking the fleeing soldiers with their lances and coup sticks and counting coup. Only the forty or so men around Custer fought in a disciplined fashion after the lines of Keogh's and Calhoun's companies broke down. Some of the Indian witnesses opined that if the entire command had fought like those men, the soldiers would not have been wiped out.

For their part, the men around Custer shot their horses to use them as barricades, and made their last stand at the end of the ridge. Most of the troops never made it there. According to the Indian accounts, one trooper escaped on horseback, but then "went crazy" and shot himself dead with his pistol. Two others, apparently were alive on the battlefield when the fight was over and the women came upon them. One tried to play dead, but when they began cutting on him he got up and began fighting them, until a brave rode up and shot him dead. The other trooper was sitting up, dazed, and the squaws bent his head back and sawed it off with their knives. All the dead were stripped and mutilated in some fashion, though Custer's body seems to have suffered the least. Many of the dead had had their skulls crushed with the heavy war clubs wielded by the Indians.

The only survivor of the unit was Captain Keogh's horse, [[Commanche]]. For years afterward, this horse lined up with the 7th when the unit bugler blew the call to order, and eerily went through the proper steps in his proper place at the end of the line with his company.


=== Custer's resistance===
=== Custer's resistance===
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Recent archaeological work at the battlefield site indicates that Custer initially deployed his troops in skirmish lines per Army doctrine. This deployment would have resulted in only approximately 150 troopers providing defensive fire over several long skirmish lines. As individual troopers were killed, wounded or their carbines jammed, the skirmish lines became untenable.<ref>Fox, pp. 295-318.</ref> [[The History Channel]] series ''Battlefield Detectives'' suggested in 2003 that there may not have been a 'last stand' as it has come down to us through history. Instead, archaeologists suggested that Custer's troops weren't surrounded and picked off but rather simply swamped by a single charge.
Recent archaeological work at the battlefield site indicates that Custer initially deployed his troops in skirmish lines per Army doctrine. This deployment would have resulted in only approximately 150 troopers providing defensive fire over several long skirmish lines. As individual troopers were killed, wounded or their carbines jammed, the skirmish lines became untenable.<ref>Fox, pp. 295-318.</ref> [[The History Channel]] series ''Battlefield Detectives'' suggested in 2003 that there may not have been a 'last stand' as it has come down to us through history. Instead, archaeologists suggested that Custer's troops weren't surrounded and picked off but rather simply swamped by a single charge.


The Sioux Chief Red Horse, who fought in the fight, informed Col. W. H. Wood, that the indians suffered 136 dead, and 160 wounded during the entire battle of the greasy grass.<ref>Graham, Col. W. A. "The Custer Myth", NY, Bonanza Books, 1953, pg 60.</ref> David Humphries Miller, who between 1935 and 1955 interviewed the last Indian survivors of the battle, wrote that the Custer fight, lasted less than one-half hour.<ref>Miller, David Humphreys, "Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, (reprint of 1957 edition) pg 158</ref>
The Sioux Chief Red Horse, who fought in the fight, informed Col. W. H. Wood, that the indians suffered 136 dead, and 160 wounded during the entire battle of the greasy grass.<ref>Graham, Col. W. A. "The Custer Myth", NY, Bonanza Books, 1953, pg 60.</ref> David Humphries Miller, who between 1935 and 1955 interviewed the last Indian survivors of the battle, wrote that the Custer fight lasted less than one-half hour,<ref>Miller, David Humphreys, "Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, (reprint of 1957 edition) pg 158</ref>, or, as one Indian witness put it, "about as long as it takes a White man to eat his lunch."


While many of Custer's troops were recruits who did not possess an adequate level of military training and skill, archaeological evidence also suggests that they were undernourished and in poor physical condition, but that it was usual in the army at this time.<ref>Barnard, pp. 121-136.</ref>
While many of Custer's troops were recruits who did not possess an adequate level of military training and skill, archaeological evidence also suggests that they were undernourished and in poor physical condition, but that condition was usual in the army at this time.<ref>Barnard, pp. 121-136.</ref>


=== The aftermath ===
=== The aftermath ===
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*Half Yellow Face: Crow Scout for the 7th<ref>Above table based upon Nichols, ''Men With Custer''...</ref>
*Half Yellow Face: Crow Scout for the 7th<ref>Above table based upon Nichols, ''Men With Custer''...</ref>
*[[John D. Lindsay]]: Scout for the 7th, ''wounded''
*[[John D. Lindsay]]: Scout for the 7th, ''wounded''
*[[Black Elk]], young Lakota brave, killed his first trooper at the Greasy Grass.


==Prominent Native Americans in the battle==
==Prominent Native Americans in the battle==
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* Hardoff, R. G. (editor), ''Camp, Custer and the Little Big Horn''. El Segundo, California: Upton and Sons, 1997.
* Hardoff, R. G. (editor), ''Camp, Custer and the Little Big Horn''. El Segundo, California: Upton and Sons, 1997.
* Michno, Gregory F., ''Lakota Noon, the Indian narrative of Custer's defeat'', Mountain Press, 1997
* Michno, Gregory F., ''Lakota Noon, the Indian narrative of Custer's defeat'', Mountain Press, 1997
* Neihardt, John G. (editor), ''Black Elk Speaks''. University of Nebraska Press, 1979.
* Miller, David, H., ''Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story'', University of Nebraska Press, 1985
* Miller, David, H., ''Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story'', University of Nebraska Press, 1985
* Neihardt, John G. (editor), ''Black Elk Speaks''. University of Nebraska Press, 1979.
* Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), ''Men with Custer: Biographies of the 7th Cavalry: [[June 25]], [[1876]] ''. Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 2000.
* Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), ''Men with Custer: Biographies of the 7th Cavalry: [[June 25]], [[1876]] ''. Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 2000.
* Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), ''Reno Court of Inquiry''. Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 1996.
* Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), ''Reno Court of Inquiry''. Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 1996.

Revision as of 06:11, 5 September 2007

Battle of the Little Bighorn
Part of the Black Hills War

Custer Massacre at Big Horn, Montana —
June 25, 1876
, artist unknown
DateJune 25June 26, 1876
Location
Result Native American victory
Belligerents
Lakota,
Northern Cheyenne,
Arapaho
United States
Commanders and leaders
Sitting Bull,
Crazy Horse
George A. Custer †,
Marcus Reno,
Frederick Benteen,
James Calhoun †
Strength
949 lodges (probably 950-1,200 warriors) 31 officers,
566 troopers,
15 armed civilians,
~35-40 scouts
Casualties and losses
At least 54 killed,
~168 wounded (according to Sitting Bull and Red Horse); or 136 killed, 160 wounded
~268 killed (16 officers, 242 troopers, 10 civilians/scouts),
~55 wounded

The Battle of the Little Bighorn — also known as Custer's Last Stand and Custer Massacre and, in the parlance of the relevant Native Americans, the Battle of the Greasy Grass — was an armed engagement between a Lakota-Northern Cheyenne combined force and the 7th Cavalry of the United States Army. It occurred June 25June 26, 1876, near the Little Bighorn River in the eastern Montana Territory.

The battle was the most famous action of the Indian Wars and was a victory for the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne. A U.S. cavalry detachment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer was annihilated.

Prelude to battle

Thousands of Indians had slipped away from their reservations through early 1876. Military officials planned a three-pronged expedition to corral them and force them back to the reservations, using both infantry and cavalry, as well as a small detachment of Gatling guns. Brig. Gen. George Crook's column moved north from Fort Fetterman in the Wyoming Territory toward the Powder River area. Col. John Gibbon's column of 6 companies of the 7th Infantry and 4 of the 2nd Cavalry marched east from Fort Ellis in western Montana Territory. The third column under Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry (including George Custer's 7th Cavalry; Companies B, D and I, 6th U.S. Infantry; Companies C & G, 17th U.S. Infantry; and the Gatling gun detachment of the 20th Infantry) departed westward from Fort Abraham Lincoln in the Dakota Territory. They were accompanied by teamsters and packers with 150 wagons and a large contingent of pack mules.[1]

The coordination and planning went awry on June 17 when Crook's column was delayed after the Battle of the Rosebud and was forced to stop and regroup. Gibbon and Terry proceeded, joining forces in late June near the mouth of the Rosebud River. They formulated a plan that called for Custer's regiment to proceed up the Rosebud River, while Terry and Gibbon's united columns would proceed up the Bighorn and Little Bighorn rivers. The officers hoped to trap the Indian village between these two forces. After discovering a large Indian trail on June 15, the 7th Cavalry split from the remainder of the Terry column on June 22 and began a pursuit along the trail. Custer was offered the use of the Gatling guns but declined, saying they would slow his command.[2]. He also declined the offer of two further companies of cavalry on the basis that his regiment could handle anything they found without other assistance. Custer's scouts arrived at an overlook 14 miles (23 km) east of the Little Bighorn River on the night of June 24, as the Terry/Gibbon column was marching toward the mouth of the Little Bighorn.

7th Cavalry organization and deployment

The 7th Cavalry was a veteran organization created just after the American Civil War. Several men were veterans of the war, including many of the leading officers. A significant portion of the regiment had previously served four-and-a-half years at Ft. Riley, Kansas, during which time it fought one major engagement and numerous skirmishes, experiencing casualties of thirty-six killed and twenty-seven wounded. Six other troopers had died of drowning and fifty-one from cholera epidemics.

Half of the 7th Cavalry had just returned from eighteen months of constabulary duty in the deep South, having been recalled to Fort Abraham Lincoln to reassemble the regiment for the campaign. Approximately 20% of the troopers had been enlisted in the prior seven months (139 of an enlisted roll of 718), were only marginally trained, and had no combat or frontier experience. A sizable number of these recruits were immigrants from Ireland, England, and Prussia, just as many of the veteran troopers had been prior to their enlistments.

Of the 44 officers and 718 troopers then assigned to the 7th Cavalry (including a second lieutenant detached from the 20th Infantry and serving in L Troop), 13 officers (including the regimental commander, Col. Samuel D. Sturgis, who was on detached duty) and 152 troopers did not accompany the 7th during the campaign. Among those left behind at Fort Abraham Lincoln was the regimental band.

Following a night forced march on June 24June 25, in which Crow Indian scouts reported to Custer the presence of what was judged a very large encampment of Indians, Custer divided the 7th Cavalry into four detachments:

  • The largest detachment consisted of Troops C, E, F, I, and L, personally led by Custer. It numbered 13 officers, 198 men (7 of whom would eventually be detached before the "last stand") and 3 civilians—newspaper reporter Mark Kellogg and 2 scouts. Two of Custer's relatives later joined the column. Troop C was commanded by Custer's brother, Capt. Thomas Custer, and L Company by his brother-in-law, 1st Lt. James Calhoun. This detachment marched along a ridge line on the east bank of the Little Bighorn in an attempt to enter the encampment from the north.
  • A second detachment, led by Maj. Marcus Reno, was sent into the Little Bighorn valley to provoke an engagement. This detachment consisted of Troops A, G, and M, and numbered 11 officers, 131 troopers, and most of the approximately 35 Sioux, Ree/Arikara and Crow scouts.
  • A third detachment was led by a company commander, Capt. Frederick Benteen, and was made up of Troops D, H, and K, with 5 officers and 110 men. Its mission is controversial, with some analysts arguing it was simply to scout nearby valleys while others believe he was intended to find and enter the Little Big Horn Valley and sweep up towards the village. He was ordered to attack any body of Indians he encountered despite being out of supporting distance from the rest of the command. [3]Benteen himself described his mission to his wife in a letter days after the action, "General Custer divided the 7th Cav into 3 Battalions —about 15 miles from an indian village, the whereabout of which he did not know exactly. I was ordered with 3 Co's., D, H, & K, to go to the left for the purpose of hunting for the valley of the river—indian camp—or anything I could find. I found nothing, and after marching 10 miles or so in pursuit of the same determined to return to Custer's trail."[4]
  • The last group was the regimental pack train, consisting of 7 or 8 troopers from each company and escorted by Troop B. Commanded by Capt. Thomas McDougall, this sizable force had 2 officers, 127 troopers, and 7 civilian packers.

Each of the first three detachments was to seek out the Indian encampments, attack them, and hold them in place until the other two detachments arrived to support. Custer had employed similar tactics in 1868 during the Battle of the Washita.

Battle

Reno's attack

The first detachment to attack was Major Reno's, conducted after receiving orders from Custer issued by Lt. William W. Cooke. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or propensity to stand and fight, were to pursue the Indians and "bring them to battle". However, Custer did promise to "support...[Reno] with the whole outfit". Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today called Reno Creek and immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and ...not running away".

Sending a message to Custer, but hearing nothing in return, Reno advanced rapidly northward, stating that he drove the enemy "with ease". However, he suspected "a trap" and stopped a few hundred yards short of the encampment, dismounting and deploying in a skirmish line, as standard army doctrine called for. In deploying in a skirmish line, every fifth trooper handled the horses for four troopers taking firing positions, thus immediately reducing the fighting force by 20%. The troopers on the skirmish line were positioned five to ten yards apart, with officers just to their rear and the troopers with horses behind the officers. After about 20 minutes of long distance firing he had taken only one casualty but the odds against him had become more obvious (Reno estimated five to one) and Custer had not reinforced him. After a bullet splattered the brains of the Indian scout next to him across the side of his face, Reno hastily ordered a withdrawal into nearby woods in a loop of the river. As pressure from the counterattacking Indians mounted, he was then forced to make a disorderly retreat across the river to reach the high ground of the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was confused and immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. Reno later reported that 3 officers and 29 troopers had been killed during the retreat. In the subsequent fording of the river he lost another officer and 13-18 men, who were left behind in the woods. Most of these men eventually rejoined the detachment, however.

The battlefield today.

Atop the bluffs, Reno's shaken troops soon linked up with the detachment of Captain Benteen, arriving from the south. This force had been on its lateral scouting mission when it had been summoned by a messenger from Custer to "Come on...big village, be quick...bring pacs...". (This messenger was John Martin, a trumpeter, who was the last white person to see Custer alive and survive the battle.) Benteen's coincidental arrival on the bluffs was just in time to save Reno's men from possible annihilation. Their detachments were then reinforced by McDougall and the pack train. The 14 officers and 340 troopers on the bluffs organized an all-around defense and dug rifle pits.

Despite hearing heavy gunfire from the north, Benteen concentrated on reinforcing Reno's badly wounded battalion, rather than continuing on toward Custer. After an hour, nearing five o'clock and the end of the Custer fight, Capt. Thomas Weir and Company D moved out against orders to make contact with Custer. They advanced a mile and could see Lakota shooting in the distance, but were under considerable pressure themselves. The other companies eventually followed by assigned battalions, first Benteen, then Reno, and finally the pack train, but growing Lakota attacks forced all seven companies to return to the bluff before the pack train, with the ammunition, had moved even a quarter mile. Benteen's apparent reluctance prompted later criticism that he had failed to follow orders.

Custer's fight

The gunfire heard on the bluffs was from Custer's fight. His force of 208 was engaged by the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne approximately 3.5 miles (6 km) to the north. Having driven Reno's force away from the encampment and isolated it, many warriors were free to pursue Custer. The route taken by Custer to his "Last Stand" remains a subject of debate. It does seem clear that after ordering Reno to charge, Custer continued down Reno Creek to within about a half mile (800 m) of the Little Bighorn, but then turned north, and climbed up the bluffs, reaching the same spot to which Reno would soon retreat. From this point, he could see Reno, on the other side of the river, charging the village.

File:X-33628.jpg
Lieutenant Colonel Custer on horseback and his U. S. Army troops make their last charge at the Battle of the Little Bighorn.

Custer then rode north along the bluffs, and descended into a drainage called Medicine Tail Coulee, which led to the river. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the coulee, going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. Other authorities believe that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered by the Indians who came from the Reno fight, it was too late to break back through to the south, where Reno and Benteen could have provided reinforcement.

Within less than 30 minutes,[5][6][7] Custer's force was completely annihilated. Only two men from the 7th Cavalry later claimed to have seen Custer engage the Indians—a young Crow whose name translated as Curley, and a trooper named Peter Thompson, who had fallen behind Custer's column, and most 'white' accounts of the last moments of Custer's forces are conjecture. There were a number of eyewitness accounts collected from indians at the time, and many years later.[8][9] Lakota accounts assert that Crazy Horse personally led one of the large groups of Lakota who overwhelmed the cavalrymen.[10] Although exact numbers are difficult to determine, Custer had with him about 208 officers and men, while the combined Indian warriors numbered as many as 1800. Thus, in absolute terms Custer's own unit was outnumbered 9-1, but the ratio during the fighting was probably somewhat smaller, since hundreds of Indians were distracted throughout the fight by Reno and Benteen's units to the rear.

White apologists for the disaster hold that the disaster occurred because some of the Indians were armed with repeating Spencer and Winchester rifles. This claim is overblown, however, and many of the Indians did not even carry modern weapons. The 13-year-old Black Elk, in his first fight, was ordered by an older brave to finish off a wounded cavalry trooper and take his rifle. It was Black Elk's first carbine.[11] For its part, the 7th Cavalry was not armed with available repeaters (7-shot Spencer carbines had been available since 1863, higher-capacity Henry rifles for about as long, and the famous Winchester 73 was already 3 years old. Still, the federal army had almost always eschewed purchasing these superior weapons for their troops, even during the Civil War, though Lincoln, an excellent frontier rifleman himself, had signed an executive order by 1863 allowing those cavalry units that chose to purchase these weapons to do so.). Thus, instead of the best light weapons available, Custer's men carried the heavy, breach-loading, single-shot Springfield .45-70 caliber carbine. This weapon had a slow rate of fire and tended to jam when overheated. Worse, the Springfield Model 1873 carbines had been issued with copper cartridges. Troopers soon discovered that the copper expanded in the breech when heated upon firing and jammed the rifle, preventing extraction of the fired cartridge case. This situation required manual extraction with a knife blade, rendering the carbines useless in combat except as a club. Accordingly, Custer's men at the end turned to their more reliable revolvers. Custer himself was known to have owned a pair of Webley RIC (Royal Irish Constabulary) double action revolvers, chambered in .442 Webley, which he used at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, instead of the Colt Single Action Army, issued to his troops.[12]

Although the opposing warriors carried a large variety of weapons, from bows and arrows, war clubs (the traditional Plains Indian war club--the painted femur of a bison or elk) and lances to (some say) Henry rifles, the Indian accounts, painted on buffalo hides after the battle, depict the fight as one of Indian bows and arrows against Army carbines and pistols. The bow gave the Cheyenne and Sioux warriors an advantage in the rough, brush-covered terrain, allowing them to lob arrows into the soldiers positions from below the ridge without exposing themselves. Indeed, the terrain of the battlefield gave Lakota and Cheyenne bows an advantage, since Custer's troops were pinned in a depression on higher ground from which they could not use direct fire at the Indians in defilade. U.S. small arms might have been more accurate over open distances, but the fighting on this occasion was close combat in heavy cover, where rate of fire and reliability of a weapon were more important attributes. After Crazy Horse led his fifty or so men across the middle of the strung-out defensive line, the Indian accounts agree that the battle deteriorated into a "buffalo run", in which the soldiers who could do so rode for Custer's position, and those without horses ran after them. At this point in the battle, the Indians were riding along the ridge en masse, whacking the fleeing soldiers with their lances and coup sticks and counting coup. Only the forty or so men around Custer fought in a disciplined fashion after the lines of Keogh's and Calhoun's companies broke down. Some of the Indian witnesses opined that if the entire command had fought like those men, the soldiers would not have been wiped out.

For their part, the men around Custer shot their horses to use them as barricades, and made their last stand at the end of the ridge. Most of the troops never made it there. According to the Indian accounts, one trooper escaped on horseback, but then "went crazy" and shot himself dead with his pistol. Two others, apparently were alive on the battlefield when the fight was over and the women came upon them. One tried to play dead, but when they began cutting on him he got up and began fighting them, until a brave rode up and shot him dead. The other trooper was sitting up, dazed, and the squaws bent his head back and sawed it off with their knives. All the dead were stripped and mutilated in some fashion, though Custer's body seems to have suffered the least. Many of the dead had had their skulls crushed with the heavy war clubs wielded by the Indians.

The only survivor of the unit was Captain Keogh's horse, Commanche. For years afterward, this horse lined up with the 7th when the unit bugler blew the call to order, and eerily went through the proper steps in his proper place at the end of the line with his company.

Custer's resistance

Recent archaeological work at the battlefield site indicates that Custer initially deployed his troops in skirmish lines per Army doctrine. This deployment would have resulted in only approximately 150 troopers providing defensive fire over several long skirmish lines. As individual troopers were killed, wounded or their carbines jammed, the skirmish lines became untenable.[13] The History Channel series Battlefield Detectives suggested in 2003 that there may not have been a 'last stand' as it has come down to us through history. Instead, archaeologists suggested that Custer's troops weren't surrounded and picked off but rather simply swamped by a single charge.

The Sioux Chief Red Horse, who fought in the fight, informed Col. W. H. Wood, that the indians suffered 136 dead, and 160 wounded during the entire battle of the greasy grass.[14] David Humphries Miller, who between 1935 and 1955 interviewed the last Indian survivors of the battle, wrote that the Custer fight lasted less than one-half hour,[15], or, as one Indian witness put it, "about as long as it takes a White man to eat his lunch."

While many of Custer's troops were recruits who did not possess an adequate level of military training and skill, archaeological evidence also suggests that they were undernourished and in poor physical condition, but that condition was usual in the army at this time.[16]

The aftermath

After the Custer force was annihilated, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne regrouped to attack Reno and Benteen. The fight continued until dark (approximately 9:00 p.m. by local timekeeping) and for much of the next day, with the outcome in doubt. Reno credited Benteen's leadership with repulsing a severe attack on the portion of the perimeter held by Companies H and M.[17] On June 26 the column under Terry approached from the north, and the Indians drew off in the opposite direction. The wounded were given what treatment was available at that time; five later died of their wounds. Two of the regiment's three surgeons had been with Custer's column; the remaining doctor was assisted by interpreter Fred Gerard.

File:X-33633.jpg
Lieutenant Colonel Custer and his U. S. Army troops are defeated in battle with Native American Lakota Sioux, Crow, Northern, and Cheyenne, on the Little Bighorn Battlefield, June 25, 1876 at Little Bighorn River, Montana.

An examination was made of the Custer battle site. The Indian dead had mostly been removed from the field. The 7th's dead were identified as best as possible and hastily buried where they fell. Custer was found to have been shot in the left temple and in the left chest; either wound would have been fatal. He also suffered a wound to the arm. Some Lakota oral histories assert that Custer committed suicide to avoid capture and subsequent torture or death—as Custer believed—but he was right-handed. His body was found near the top of "Last Stand Hill" where a large obelisk inscribed with the names of the 7th's dead now stands. Most of the dead had been stripped of their clothing, mutilated, and were in an advanced state of decomposition, such that identification of many of the bodies was impossible.[18]

From the evidence, it was impossible to determine what exactly had transpired, but there was evidence of prolonged organized resistance (according to Indian and federal testimonies [19] ). Several days after the battle, the young Crow scout Curley gave an account of the battle which indicated that Custer had attacked the village after crossing the river at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee and had been driven back across the river, retreating up the slope to the hill where his body was later found.[20] This scenario seemed compatible with Custer's aggressive style of warfare, and with some of the evidence found on the ground, and formed the basis for many of the popular accounts of the battle.

"Custer's Last Stand." Native American Lakota Sioux, Crow, Northern, and Cheyenne, defeat Lieutenant Colonel Custer standing center, wearing buckskin, with few of his soldiers of the Seventh Cavalry still standing, Little Bighorn Battlefield, June 26, 1876 at the Little Bighorn River, Montana.

Custer then released the Crow Scouts, including Curley and White Man Runs Him, from their duty. (White Man Runs Him was the first to tell General Terry's officers that Custer's force had "been wiped out".) Estimates of Lakota and Cheyenne casualties widely vary, from as few as 36 dead (from Indian listings of the dead by name) to as many as 300. The 7th Cavalry suffered 52% casualties: 16 officers and 242 troopers killed or died of wounds, 1 officer and 51 troopers wounded. Every soldier in Custer's detachment was killed, although for years rumors persisted of survivors.[21] The sole survivor that was found by General Terry's troops was Captain Keogh's horse Comanche.[22]

By July, the 7th cavalry had been restocked with officers and new recruiting efforts were underway. It would again take the field in pursuit of its adversaries, but its legacy remains the Little Bighorn.

For further details on participants and casualties, see below.

After the battle

Scene of Custer's last stand, looking in the direction of the ford and the Indian village, 1877.

In 1878, the army awarded 24 Medals of Honor to participants in the fight on the bluffs for bravery, most for risking their lives to carry water from the river up the hill to the wounded.[23] Few questioned the conduct of the enlisted men, but many questioned the tactics, strategy, and conduct of the officers.

The Reno Court of Inquiry, and the accusations of betrayal and cowardice

The battle was the subject of an army Court of Inquiry, made at Reno's request, in 1879 in Chicago, in which Reno's conduct was scrutinized. Some testimony was presented suggesting that he was drunk and a coward, but since none of this came from army officers, Reno's conduct was found to be without fault. However, Lieutenant Jesse Lee, Reno Court of Inquiry transcriber, wrote the following letter to General Miles, who was accusing Reno and Benteen of betrayal:

Your chapter on Custer’s last fight (which said that Benteen and Reno were traitors) is a vindication I have long wished to see from the pen of one who writes “without fear or favour or affection"; one whose potent words of truth will carry conviction to millions who wanted light in clean, straight-up rays about that tragic event. I thank God that you have lived to spread before the world what I believe to be “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth” on Custer. I was Recorder on the Reno Court of Inquiry, but the proceedings were never published in full. I talked with many Indians who were in that fight, and your chapter is almost identical with what I learned from a variety of sources.

[citation needed]

Benteen has been criticized for "dawdling" on the first day of the fight, and disobeying Custer's order. Many books and documentaries have gathered strong evidences against both Benteen and Reno, for military betrayal, an accusation shared by such figures as US Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles or Reno Court of Inquiry transcriber Jesse Lee.[citation needed]

Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles, the US highest military commander in 1895 and one of the most successful Indian fighters of all times, wrote in 1877 while studying the battlefield: "The more I study the moves here [on the Little Big Horn], the more I have admiration for Custer." [24]

For years a debate raged as to whether Custer himself had disobeyed Terry's order not to attack the village until reinforcements arrived. Finally, almost a hundred years after the fight, a document surfaced which indicated that Terry actually had given Custer considerable freedom to do as he saw fit (Maria Adam's controversy, which eventually stated that the story was true [25]).

Death of Custer - A dramatic portrayal of Native American man stabbing Custer, with dead Native Americans lying on ground, in scene by Pawnee Bill's Wild West Show performers. c.1905

Custer's widow Libby actively affected the historiography of the battle by suppressing criticism of her husband. A number of participants decided to wait for her death before disclosing what they knew; however, she outlived almost all of them. As a result, the event was recreated along tragic Victorian lines in numerous books, films and other media. The story of Custer's purported heroic attack across the river, however, was undermined by the account of participant Gall, who told Lt. Edward Godfrey that Custer never came near the river.[26] In spite of this, however, Custer's legend was embedded in the American imagination as a heroic officer fighting valiantly against savage forces, an image popularized in Wild West extravaganzas hosted by showman "Buffalo Bill" Cody, Pawnee Bill, and others.

By the end of the 20th century, the general recognition of the mistreatment of the various Indian tribes in the conquest of the American West, and the perception of Custer's role in it, have changed the image of the battle and of Custer. The Little Bighorn is now viewed by some as a confrontation between relentless U.S. westward expansion and warriors defending their land and way of life.

Battlefield preservation

Indian Memorial

The site was first preserved as a national cemetery in 1879, to protect graves of the 7th Cavalry troopers buried there. It was redesignated Custer Battlefield National Monument in 1946, and later renamed Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument in 1991.

Memorialization on the battlefield began in 1879 with a temporary monument to U.S. dead. This was replaced with the current marble obelisk in 1881. In 1890 the marble blocks that dot the field were added to mark the place where the U.S. cavalry soldiers fell. The bill that changed the name of the national monument also called for an Indian Memorial to be built near Last Stand Hill. On Memorial Day 1999, two red granite markers were added to the battlefield where Native American warriors fell. As of December 2006, there are now a total of ten warrior markers (three at the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, seven on the Custer Battlefield).[27]

7th Cavalry officers at the Little Bighorn

An obelisk commemorates the U.S. dead.

Crittenden was on loan to the 7th Cavalry from the 20th U.S. Infantry, since the cavalry regiment was short on officers.

Photo taken in 1894 by H.R. Locke on Battle Ridge looking toward Last Stand Hill top center. Wooden Leg Hill can be seen at the far top right.

Civilians killed

Notable scouts/interpreters in the battle

Prominent Native Americans in the battle

  • Soon after the battle, Anheuser-Busch commissioned a painting of "Custer's Last Stand" which was distributed as a print to saloons all over America. The painting itself was so common as to became a cultural icon. It is reputed to still be in some bars today.
  • In an episode of The Twilight Zone entitled "The 7th Is Made Up of Phantoms", three members of a modern National Guard troop encounter the same signs Major Reno and his men did while participating in war games and are able to join the battle on the side of Custer.
  • The film Little Big Man leads up to the battle and features a reconstruction of it in the final scenes, complete with a confused and manic Custer realizing to his horror that he and his command are "being wiped out".
  • The 1958 Walt Disney film Tonka is a highly fictionalized history of the horse, Comanche, that survived the battle. This was the first film to tell the story of Custer's Last Stand from the Indian point of view and a fairly accurate version of the battle takes place near the end of the film. As of March, 2007, the film is not available on video.
  • George MacDonald Fraser places his fictional anti-hero, Flashman at the battle in the book Flashman and the Redskins. Flashman survives the battle thanks to an Indian woman he has had intercourse with and to his illegitimate son, Frank Standing Bear, who had grown up among the Sioux. Flashman elsewhere comments that the Battle of the Little Big Horn is more proof that any sane person should run the other way from any military action where the Irish tune Garryowen is played beforehand. The drinking song was also popular among British soldiers at the Charge of the Light Brigade, which he also survived, barely.
  • A short story by Frederick Forsyth, in his collection "The Veteran", concerns a fictional survivor of the battle.
  • The Histeria! episode "Megalomaniacs!" featured a sketch about Custer's Last Stand in which the Kid Chorus, misled by its name, think that Custer is running a custard stand. (This sketch only appeared in network reruns to replace a controversial sketch about the Spanish Inquisition.)

See also Cultural depictions of George Armstrong Custer.

References

  • Sklenar, Larry, To Hell with Honor, General Custer and the Little Big Horn, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2000
  • Barnard, Sandy, Digging into Custer's Last Stand. Huntington Beach, California: Ventana Graphics, 1998. ISBN 0-9618087-5-6.
  • Brininstool, E. A., Troopers With Custer. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Boooks, 1994. ISBN 0-8177-1742-9.
  • Connell, Evan S., Son of Morning Star. New York: North Point Press, 1984. ISBN 0-86547-510-5.
  • Dustin, Fred, The Custer Tragedy: Events Leading Up to and Following the Little Big Horn Campaign on 1876. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, 1939.
  • Fox, Richard Allan, Jr., Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8061-2496-2.
  • Graham, Col. William A., The Custer Myth: A Source Book for Custeriana. New York: Bonanza Books, 1953.
  • Hardoff, R. G. (editor), Camp, Custer and the Little Big Horn. El Segundo, California: Upton and Sons, 1997.
  • Michno, Gregory F., Lakota Noon, the Indian narrative of Custer's defeat, Mountain Press, 1997
  • Miller, David, H., Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story, University of Nebraska Press, 1985
  • Neihardt, John G. (editor), Black Elk Speaks. University of Nebraska Press, 1979.
  • Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), Men with Custer: Biographies of the 7th Cavalry: June 25, 1876 . Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 2000.
  • Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), Reno Court of Inquiry. Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 1996.
  • Panzeri, Peter, Little Big Horn, 1876: Custer’s Last Stand. London, UK: Osprey, 1995. ISBN 185532458X.
  • Reno, Marcus A., The official record of a court of inquiry convened at Chicago, Illinois, January 13, 1879, by the President of the United States upon the request of Major Marcus A. Reno, 7th U.S. Cavalry, to investigate his conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25-26, 1876. on-line in the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections
  • Sarf, Wayne Michael, The Little Bighorn Campaign, Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1993.
  • Viola, Herman J., Little Bighorn Remembered: The Untold Indian Story of Custer's Last Stand. Westminster, Maryland: Times Books, 1999, ISBN 0-812932-5-6-0.

Notes

  1. ^ See Sarf for a breakdown of the composition of each of these columns.
  2. ^ See Panzeri.
  3. ^ For an alternative theory concerning Custer's intentions in deploying Benteen to the left based on detailed examination of the terrain using Google Earth see this web articleGoogle Earth analysis which also refutes accusations of Benteen travelling slowly.
  4. ^ Benteen letter to his wife, 2 July 1876, Grahram, Col. W. A, "The Custter Myth" New York, Bonanza Books, 1953, pg 187,
  5. ^ Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, pg 158
  6. ^ Graham, Benteen letter to Capt. R.E. Thompson, pg 211
  7. ^ Graham, Gall's Narrative pg 88
  8. ^ Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985
  9. ^ For an analysis of Curley's account, see Graham, pp. 10-18. Fox, pp. 316-317 discusses Thompson.
  10. ^ Graham, pp. 45-56.
  11. ^ Michno
  12. ^ John A. Doerner, Chief Historian, Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument
  13. ^ Fox, pp. 295-318.
  14. ^ Graham, Col. W. A. "The Custer Myth", NY, Bonanza Books, 1953, pg 60.
  15. ^ Miller, David Humphreys, "Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, (reprint of 1957 edition) pg 158
  16. ^ Barnard, pp. 121-136.
  17. ^ Reno Court of Inquiry
  18. ^ Brininstool, 60-62.
  19. ^ Michno, "Lakota Noon", Mountain Press Publishing.
  20. ^ Fox, pp. 10-13.
  21. ^ Graham, 146. Lt. Edward Godfrey reported finding a dead 7th Cavalry horse (shot in the head), a grain sack, and a carbine at the mouth of the Rosebud; he conjectured that a soldier had escaped Custer's fight and rafted across the river, abandoning his played out horse.
  22. ^ Comanche, badly wounded, had been overlooked or left behind by the Native Americans, who had taken the other surviving horses. Comanche was taken back to the steamer Far West and returned to Fort Abraham Lincoln to be nursed back to health.
  23. ^ U.S. Army Medal of Honor website.
  24. ^ Sklenar, page 341.
  25. ^ Researcher William Graham doubted the story, which stated that Custer's black servant Mary Adams had heard a conversation between Custer and Terry, the latter saying that the former had complete freedom. Graham found that Mary Sadams wasn't with the 7th cavalry in 1876. However, recent studies have shown that Maria Adams, Mary's sister, was Custer's servant.
  26. ^ Godfrey incorporated this into his important publication in 1892 in The Century Magazine.
  27. ^ National Park Service website for the Little Bighorn Battlefield
  28. ^ Above table based upon Nichols, Men With Custer...

Further reading

  • Chiaventone, Frederick J., A Road We Do Not Know: A Novel of Custer at the Little Bighorn. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
  • Connell, Evan S., Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Bighorn. New York: North Point Press, 1984.
  • Gray, John S., Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991.
  • Sklenar, Larry, To Hell with Honor, Custer and the Little Bighorn. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000.
  • Michno, Gregory F., Lakota Noon: The Indian narratives of Custer's defeat. Missoula, Montana: Mountain Press Publishing, 1997.
  • Sandoz, Mari., The Battle of the Little Bighorn. Lippincott Major Battle Series. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966.
  • Utley, Robert, Custer: Cavalier in Buckskin. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press; Revised edition, 2001.
  • Welch, James w/Stekler, Paul, Killing Custer - The Battle of the Little Bighorn and the Fate of the Plains Indians. New York: Norton, 1994.